Category: Opinion

The 24^th of February marks the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the terrible human losses and the increased security desrabilisation in Europe, the ongoing conflict has undermined the European Union’s main energy supply. The unpreparedness that surfaced from the conflict highlighted the necessity to diversify the union’s energy suppliers. While energetic self-sufficiency would be preferable, the EU’s capacity to rely exclusively on its member states for energy supply remains a long-term objective, so an alternative is urgently needed in the interim.  

This shift in supplier has been taken as an opportunity to transform European energy production methods to better align them with the European Green Deal, a vast plan aiming to make the union carbon neutral by 2050: three months after the start of the war, the REPowerEU plan was launched, a package combining the necessity to find alternative reliable energy sources to achieving the Green Deal.  

North Africa has been widely considered as the new exporter, as it is among the most prolific territories for green energy production worldwide, and, crucially, Europe’s neighbour. However, a close inspection of the region reveals significant challenges associated with these projects. This article assesses the potential of expanded green energy agreements between Europe and North Africa under REPowerEU, pondering their benefits with their associated risks, and shows how, despite such risks, pursuing these deals remains worthwhile.   

North Africa: abundant green energy within reach 

The idea of utilising the valuable pool of energy just beyond the Mediterranean Sea is not new. Small green energy deals started flourishing between the beginning of the millennium and the 2008 financial crisis, at which point they came to a halt. In the past decade however, the scaling up of more efficient methods to capture both wind and solar energy at considerably more competitive prices has revitalised interest in the Southern Neighbourhood: the average price of utility-scale solar plants electricity declined from $0.45 per kilowatt hour in 2010 to 0.05$ in 2022. Currently, North Africa provides 10% of the EU’s total energy and over two-thirds of its natural gas. The first large-scale green energy export deal, the Green Partnership Agreement, was struck between the union and Morocco in 2022, and talks for similar projects are ongoing between Egypt and Greece, Tunisia, Italy and Malta, and more. 

Two principal reasons make North Africa the perfect candidate to be the EU’s green energy supply: a high production potential, and its proximity to the importing party. 

While countries such as Spain and Germany are expanding their green energy facilities to reach self-sufficiency, not every country in the union meets the geophysical and/or financial prerequisites for this growth, thus currently this effort cannot be reproduced union-wide. The Maghreb specifically is blessed by a worldwide rare combination of high solar radiation and high wind coming from the Atlantic Ocean, generating massive amounts of energy while allowing electrolysers to run almost non-stop. IRENA estimates North African installable capacities at 2,792 gigawatts for solar and 223 gigawatts for wind, surpassing Europe’s total electricity output in 2021 by more than 2.5 times.  

North Africa’s position in respect to Europe also eases energy transportation as the supply chain of green hydrogen is shortened. The proximity of the production and processing infrastructure to the recipient countries reduces transport costs, improves oversight of value chains, and strengthens the latter’s resilience. Finally, forging new deals with North Africa presents the opportunity to strengthen enduring diplomatic ties between the EU and its neighbours, in addition to long-term development projects in the Maghreb and Egypt.  

Security in the Southern Neighbourhood  

Despite these priceless resources, tensions in the region and physical constraints of energy exportation are causing concerns in the EU around North Africa’s capability to function as a secure alternative to Russia.  

Wind and solar energy are expected to be shipped abroad under the form of ammonia, or liquid hydrogen. Hydrogen demands temperatures of -253°C to maintain a liquid form, resulting in impractical transportation and exorbitant shipment costs. These constraints preclude the movement in containers of the quantity of ammonia needed to provide energy to the EU 27, making pipelines necessary for the scope. As shown by the sabotage of the Nord Stream Pipeline, rendered inoperable following a series of explosions in September 2022, pipelines are vulnerable in conflict areas, as energy supply can be made into a target or a weapon. While the former was the case for the Nord Stream, in November 2021 diplomatic tensions led Morocco to interrupt gas flows from Algeria to Spain, utilising gas flow to harm its opponent. Another similar threat to stability of energy flowing from North Africa is the contested territory of West-Sahara, currently mostly under Moroccan control but seeking independence. Potential energy from wind- and solar- rich Mauritania would have to cross this area, making it vulnerable to non-state groups attacks.  

Financial investments and competition  

The EU is not the only actor interested in the North African energy cornucopia. Since the announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project a decade ago, China has begun infrastructure and energy projects in the entire African continent. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-scale framework of land and sea infrastructure projects spanning across Asia, Africa and Europe, encompassing transportation, telecommunication and also power production. The bulk of the BRI in Africa is focused in Sub-Saharan Africa, but Beijing’s influence also extends in the Southern Neighbourhood. There, Chinese high tech import rates have far surpassed the EU’s, and Chinese companies are paying close attention to North African green energy potential, threatening to create a strong competitor to the EU. 

Nevertheless, Chinese involvement might have a silver lining for Brussels. In a politically unstable and so-far unregulated scene such as the one in North Africa, investors will be hesitant to enter long-term offtake deals due to the uncertainty associated with the future availability and costs of green hydrogen. This might cause a cycle of de-incentivisation of investment for producers. However, Chinese companies have, on average, looser requirements for long-term deals. Their entry in the region’s market has the potential to kickstart investments, breaking the cycle and making the environment more attractive to European companies.  

While competition with Beijing does not pose the same dangers to stability that a conflict would, it still has the potential to complicate deals with African countries, and should be closely monitored. In the face of this rapid expansion, the EU must act swiftly and start planning deals in the region. 

Should the EU turn to North Africa for green energy supply? 

Although scaling up green energy production in North Africa and establishing a suitable pipeline system comes with significant costs and political challenges, the EU should proceed with these deals. Long-term investments leveraging existing resources can stimulate clean manufacturing, industrial development and sustained export revenues for green hydrogen-producing states such as Morocco and Algeria. If done correctly and with the long-term interests of both parties in mind, their benefits will vastly outweigh their associated risks. There are nonetheless strict guidelines the EU should follow.  

Along with the improvement of member states’ electricity transmission interconnections, it is paramount that the development of green energy facilities continues in European countries that have the required territorial and financial capabilities, so as to maximise concrete energy security and minimise vulnerability to external shocks.  

Pipelines in North Africa might cross conflict-ridden territories, but its proximity to Europe allows for easier and cheaper monitoring, and faster response in case a pipeline is damaged. While it is hard to quantify the extent to which North Africa is more politically stable than Sub-Saharan Africa, although this is usually the consensus, the Southern Neighbourhood is undoubtedly easier to supervise and manage. Moreover, most of the projects currently under scrutiny would incorporate pipelines that go directly from the African shore to Europe, minimising the chances of external interference. The EU should nonetheless avoid crossing contested territories and areas of conflict where possible, especially as this might aggravate tensions and interfere with local politics. 

The EU should track actions by potential competitors with a focus on China, and time its actions accordingly. While waiting for China to invest in the continent can create a more beneficial and secure investment arena for European companies, postponing action excessively might put the EU in a disadvantaged position when it finally does enter the market.  

Lastly, the EU should also ensure these agreements are symbiotic and mutually beneficial. The green transition of the union cannot come at the expense of livelihoods and the environment in Africa. Local populations must be included in the planning of pipelines through community involvement and in their construction and maintenance through the employment of local workers, creating new jobs and opportunities for development. The construction must be underpinned by thorough ecological planning, with a focus on potential water scarcity, and must ensure energy security for the local populations first and foremost.  

As the cost for solar energy is likely to be further reduced through the spread of utility-scale battery power plants, the Old Continent will be able to slowly move from energy importation to energy production. Until then, the EU should invest in green deals with its neighbours, while still avoiding over-reliance on a limited number of suppliers. 

Bibliography

European Commission (2022) REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*, European Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131

Helmeci, D. (2023) Realizing North Africa’s Green Hydrogen Potential, Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/realizing-north-africas-green-hydrogen-potential/

Jie, Y. and Wallace, J. (2021) What is China’s belt and road initiative (BRI)?, Chatham House . Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri

Pearce, F. (2023) In Scramble for clean energy, Europe is turning to North Africa, Yale Environment360. Available at: https://e360.yale.edu/features/africa-europe-solar-wind-power.

Rizzi, A. and Varvelli, A. (2023) Opening the global gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the Southern neighbourhood, European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/opening-the-global-gateway-why-the-eu-should-invest-more-in-the-southern-neighbourhood/ (Accessed: 16 February 2024).

Saleem, A. (2023) Can the Mediterranean become Europe’s energy powerhouse? Inside the push to make the sunny south a “green” hydrogen hotbed, The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/business/2023/11/13/can-the-mediterranean-become-europes-energy-powerhouse.

Naomie Djate and Manasi Rajan

Science and mathematics provide a universal language that transcends cultural and geographic boundaries. The UK government’s focus on becoming a global science and technology superpower by 2030 indicates a long-term commitment to advancing the UK’s capabilities in key technological domains. Therefore, the plan outlined by the Prime Minister and the Technology Secretary is to grow the UK economy, create high-paid jobs, enhance security, and improve lives through science, innovation, and technology (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology 2023).

STEM Education in the UK: A rising demand

Rishi Sunak highlighted the importance of numeracy in the modern job market, stating that basic numeracy skills can increase earnings by £1,600 a year. To improve the math standard in the UK, he launched the ‘Maths to 18’ plan, which includes an advisory group, expansion of Maths Hubs across England, and improved professional certifications for primary school math teachers (Crerar 2023).

The focus areas include curriculum, teacher training, career advice, enrichment activities, and funding. All students in England from five to 16 study science, technology, engineering, and mathematics separately. Initiatives aim to improve teacher quality, increase awareness of diverse STEM careers, support extracurricular activities, and allocate resources for STEM education initiatives.

Under the UK’s STEM education strategy, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines are required for pupils in grades 5 through 16. The curriculum promotes scientific thinking and creativity by emphasising application and inquiry. Additionally, it supports interdisciplinary learning by connecting STEM fields with other academic fields, including languages, the arts, and the humanities. Redesigned teacher preparation programmes aim to give educators more advanced topic knowledge and technological proficiency. Funding for continuing professional development (CPD) is offered to solve the teacher shortage and raise standards of instruction. Career education is incorporated into the curriculum to increase knowledge of various STEM vocations. Partnerships between the school and the industry are encouraged for internships and experiences. Funding initiatives such as clubs, contests, outreach programmes, and museum visits are also offered to encourage interest and involvement in STEM.

Specific initiatives aim to remove obstacles standing in the way of girls, members of underrepresented minorities, and kids from low-income families engaging in STEM activities and eventually pursuing STEM jobs. There is ongoing discussion over the best ways to evaluate students’ learning in STEM topics and the best ways to organise and balance the curriculum (Government Science & Engineering Profession 2023).

Challenges that STEM Education brings to UK School Systems

To successfully implement STEM education, specialist teachers in secondary schools play a crucial role in providing a deeper understanding of STEM subjects. The enthusiasm and confidence of a specialist teacher can significantly impact students’ interest and engagement. The Department for Education will face a key challenge in the noticeable teacher shortage already under way in England. The hardest to attract are maths and physics teachers, with 12% of maths lessons currently taught by a teacher who has a postgraduate degree (McLean, Worth, and Faulkner-Ellis 2023). One could stipulate that this directly results from non-competitive pay for teachers. In 2021/22, secondary teacher salaries dropped by12% compared to 2010/11. Moreover, compared to similar graduates, the actual growth difference in teachers’ earnings is 11%. Whilst some may point out that maths recruitment has improved when looking at the target, this is because of a lowering of the target.

A study by Hansen et al. in 2004 exemplified that the gap between teacher pay and other professions drives changes in recruitment and retention. Offering STEM secondary teachers competitive pay will strongly incentivise new STEM graduates to go into teaching. Another study produced in 2001 demonstrated that whilst teachers viewed their salary as adequate, they did not believe that it reflected their level of analysis (Barnes, Lyonette, Atfield, and Owen 2016). This rings true even today with the sharp drop in annual earnings since 2010 as noted earlier. Regional data shows a strong correlation between supply difficulties and adjusted pay gaps (Fullard and Zuccollo 2021). There is the highest difference between non-teacher and teacher pay in the areas bordering London. This suggests that current pay regions have evolved since the last revision in 2012.

The DfE’s proposed plans to reform the British Education system include a tax-free bonus plan of up to £30,000 for career teachers in the shortage subjects (Prime Minister’s Office 2023). It is still unclear how this bonus will be attributed to teachers. If it is to be attributed on a performance basis, this has already been shown to be very unpopular (Marsden 2015). Moreover, whilst this could prove effective for Early Careers Teachers, it ignores experienced teachers. Their pay growth has been almost halved since 2017 and the government’s plan will do little to remedy this (McLean, Worth, and Faulkner-Ellis 2023). The National Education Union has recently accepted a pay rise of 6.5%, but other unions have claimed it is not inflation-proof (Adams 2023).

The UK has a relatively high proportion of young teachers compared to the OECD average (STEM Learning 2022). The number of graduates with specialised qualifications in STEM subjects, including engineering, may not be sufficient to meet the demand for teachers. Graduates with STEM qualifications often have lucrative opportunities in industry, which may be more financially rewarding than teaching positions. The allure of higher salaries and diverse career paths can divert potential STEM educators away from the teaching profession. The government recognises this challenge and has introduced bursaries to incentivise graduates to pursue teaching in STEM to target the lack of teaching-learning skills. It has also committed to recruiting 17,500 more math and physics teachers (Morgan and Kirby 2016).

Programmes like Teach First, which aim to attract high-achieving graduates to teach in disadvantaged schools, are commendable for addressing educational disparities. However, the persistent shortages of teachers in STEM subjects, especially in critical areas like maths, physics, design and technology (D&T), and computing, indicate that ore comprehensive strategies may be needed (Morgan and Kirby 2016).

Recommendations

To improve recruitment and retention of STEM teachers to achieve the “Maths to 18” plan, local pay levels must be explicitly revised to ensure that all areas offer teachers competitive pay for their qualifications. Moreover, the government must commit to a long-term agreement that guarantees above-inflation pay, both current and forecasted.

The importance of continuous professional development (CPD) for teachers, including those in STEM subjects, cannot be overstated. Engaging in career long CPD is essential for educators to stay current with the latest advancements in their field, refine teaching practices, and adapt to evolving educational methodologies. Leveraging the teacher training offered by The National Science Learning Network, notably the National STEM Learning Centre in York, can provide STEM-specific professional development for teachers and support staff in schools across the UK.

Bibliography:

Adams, Richard,. “Opposition Grows among Teachers to 6.5% Pay Offer in England’.” The Guardian, 16 July 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/education/2023/jul/16/opposition-grows-among-teachers-to-65-pay-offer-in-england.

Barnes, Sally-Anne, Clare Lyonette, Gaby Atfield, and David Owen. ‘Teachers’ Pay and Equality : A Literature Review (Longitudinal Research into the Impact of Changes to Teachers’ Pay on Equality in Schools in England)’. Report. Rednal: NASUWT, March 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/79224/.

Crerar, Pippa. ‘ Rishi Sunak to Propose Maths for All Pupils up to Age 18’, January 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2023/jan/03/rishi-sunak-to-propose-maths-for-all-pupils-up-to-age-18.)

Fullard, Joshua, and James Zuccollo. “Local Pay and Teacher Retention in England.” Education Policy Institute. Gatsby Foundation, May 20, 2021. https://epi.org.uk/publications-and-research/local-pay-and-teacher-retention-in-england/.

Government Science & Engineering Profession. 2023. “STEM Futures Programme.” GOV.UK, May 18, 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/stem-futures-programme.

Maisuria, Alpesh. 2023. “‘Maths to 18’ in England – House of Commons Library.” House of Commons Library. December 14, 2023. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9780/.

Marsden, D. (2015). Teachers and Performance Pay in 2014: First Results of Survey (CEP Discussion Paper No.1332). London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mclean, Dawson , Jack Worth , and Henry Faulkner-Ellis. ‘Teacher Labour Market in EnglandAnnual Report 2023’. National Foundation for Educational Research, https://www.nfer.ac.uk/publications/teacher-labour-market-in-england-annual-report-2023/.

Morgan, Rhys, and Chris Kirby. “The UK STEM Education Landscape.” Royal Academy of Engineering, May 2016. https://raeng.org.uk/media/bcbf2kyb/112408-raoe-uk-stem-education-landscape_final_lowres.pdf.

“Plan to Forge a Better Britain through Science and Technology Unveiled,” GOV.UK, March 6 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/plan-to-forge-a-better-britain-through-science-and-technology-unveiled.

Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street, “New Qualifications to Deliver World Class Education for All,” GOV.UK, October 4, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-qualifications-to-deliver-world-class-education-for-all.

STEM Learning. “Insights into Teacher Recruitment and Retention, Challenges, Solutions and Innovations.” December 12, 2022. Accessed November 16, 2023. https://www.stem.org.uk/all-news/insights-into-teacher-recruitment-retention-challenges-solutions.

Tapsfield, James. “Rishi Sunak Steps up Push to Make People Study Maths to Age 18.” Mail Online, 17 April 2023. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11980419/Rishi-Sunak-steps-push-make-people-study-maths-age-18.html.

Veenstra-Ashmore, Famke. “Sunak’s Maths Plan Will Make A-Levels More Elitist.” Varsity. January 21, 2023.https://www.varsity.co.uk/comment/24821.

Worth, Jack. ‘Teacher Labour Market in England ’. Upton Park : National Foundation for Education Research , 2020. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED608763.pdf.

Harrison Achunche

It has now been four months since the latest escalation in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip. The Israeli Defense Force’s military campaign has been swift and unrelenting in its retaliation to Hamas’ October 7th attack. In that time, at least 28,473 Palestinian people have been killed, and about 1.9 million people displaced as 70,000+ homes have been turned to rubble (UN-OCHA, 12th Feb 2024). The mortality rate in Gaza has more than doubled (Reuters, Dec 2023). Additionally, a number of hospitals and other health facilities in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed by IDF airstrikes, making medical treatment an impossibility in some parts of Northern Gaza. The IDF claims that their airstrikes are not part of a campaign of genocidal expansion, as they are strategically targeting Hamas, a claim they are currently defending in the International Court of Justice (AP News, 2024). With Israel’s looming ground assault on Rafah (the densely populated area of Southern Gaza many Palestinians have sought refuge in) looking increasingly likely, it is crucial to emphasize the health implications of the IDF’s military strategy.

What are the main health issues currently facing the Palestinian population in Gaza?

Last month in a statement to the New York Times, the UN humanitarian chief declared Gaza “uninhabitable” (NYT, 2023). The situation on the ground is marked by an excess of morbidity and mortality, with one dominant cause: in Gaza, the sharp increase in death and disability is directly attributable to Israeli airstrikes. Many of the deaths in Gaza are traumatic injuries incurred during the bombardment of heavily populated areas by the Israeli Defense Force. Daily death tolls from Rafah alone frequently exceed hundreds. Life-limiting complications, such as limb loss due to crush injuries, are also incredibly common and, together with burn injuries, form the bulk of trauma cases.

Finding treatment is almost as much of a difficulty, as the number of functioning hospitals in Gaza has dropped dramatically. Power, supply, and staff shortages, combined with the severe damage inflicted by airstrikes on numerous hospitals, create a complex and challenging situation for the patient population to navigate. Word of mouth is a helpful tool but falls short when patients need immediate evacuation. Medical staff from around the world have been working in Gaza for many years to fill the gaps but now with hospitals in Gaza also being subject to attack, many healthcare professionals have been killed or forced to relocate to the Southern, safer areas. In an interview for BBC, Dr. Tanya Haj-Hassan described the situation as “an avalanche of human suffering”. While Gaza is familiar with a degree of health insecurity, the mass displacement coupled with the mass injuries has made the situation even more challenging to handle.

A growing problem is that the combination of hunger and disease amid an Israeli blockade on aid to the region will totally overwhelm the remaining health capacity (WHO, Dec 2023). About 95% of the population do not have access to any clean water sources and must use. This is a significant risk factor for developing life-threatening waterborne diseases such as cholera and hepatitis, as well as infection-related conditions like gastroenteritis, which can be a serious drain on health resources which have been in Gaza. Reports of diarrhea and vomiting in children suggest this may have already begun to materialize.

What immediate actions can be taken?

Ultimately, an immediate end to the bombardment of Gaza is the only viable solution. This cessation will allow crucial health services in Gaza to resume, providing a window for the battered health infrastructure to recover. Any increased provocation such as a ground offensive in Rafah should be sharply challenged. Regardless of how “Include a quote here” the Israeli government believes it can be. A consensus must be formed, recognizing that the population in Rafah is among the most vulnerable in the world. No matter how politically expedient, further military action undermines a comprehensive understanding of the global health situation. International pressure should be exerted at every instance by every major health body to emphasize the significance of

safeguarding the well-being of this vulnerable population. MSF Director General Meinie Nicolai was right to highlight how much of a “catastrophe” a ground assault would be,

In addition to this, allowing aid into the region is imperative, and any siege should not be viewed as a justified measure due to its disproportionate impact on the civilian population. International efforts should focus on ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches those in need, emphasizing the principle of protecting civilians during conflicts. Additionally, collaborative diplomatic initiatives must be pursued to foster open communication and negotiation, seeking a lasting and just resolution to the conflict.

Long Term Health Response

While the immediate health needs of the Gazan population remain unmet and show little promise of improvement in the near future, it is useful to also engage with the sheer amount of long term work that will be necessary to properly address the health crisis in Gaza.

First and foremost, the reconstruction of the Gazan health system is imperative. The current state of health infrastructure is unable to cope with the multitude of health issues that have arisen. Establishing new hospitals and clinics, equipped to handle the intricate and extensive health needs of the community, is crucial for the overall recovery.

Applying a biopsychosocial model is essential, particularly in addressing mental health concerns. The pervasive impact of conflict and war on the psychological well-being of the population necessitates a holistic approach. Mental health support, integrated into the rebuilding process, would provide a pivotal component to help Palestinians cope with the extensive trauma and stress they have been subjected to.

Considering the increasing likelihood of ongoing challenges, integrating mental health care into the redevelopment efforts is not just a response to immediate needs but an investment in the long-term well-being of the Gazan population. In the aftermath of conflict, health problems persist, requiring a sustained and compassionate effort for

rebuilding. It is not merely about constructing physical infrastructure but also about fostering an environment that promotes healing, resilience, and the overall improvement of public health in Gaza. A collaborative and empathetic approach will be essential in navigating the complexities of post-war recovery and ensuring a healthier future for the people of Gaza.

Somberly, we must also accept that lasting damage has already been done to both the population and the public health infrastructure of Gaza. The repercussions on mental health, healthcare access, and medical provision will extend across generations. The devastating loss of human life should bring pause to our collective conscience and bring pause to the military leaders of the world. In anticipation of any assault on Rafah, the lives of the Palestinian people are invaluable and must be vigorously defended.

Bibliography

2024, 12 February (2024) Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel – reported impact, 12 February 2024, Front page. Available at: https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-12-february-2024 (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

(No date) How many Palestinians have died in Gaza? Death Toll explained. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-palestinians-have-died-gaza-war-how-will-counting-continue-2023-12-06/ (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

Corder, M. and Casert, R. (2024) Top un court orders Israel to prevent genocide in Gaza but stops short of ordering cease-fire, AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-genocide-court-south-africa-27cf84e16082cde798395a95e9143c06 (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

Boxerman, A., Kershner, I. and Fuller, T. (2023) Israel expresses regret for ‘unintended harm’ to civilians in Gaza airstrike, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-airstrike.html (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

President Benjamin Netanyahu (10th Feburary 2024) Press Briefing

Martin Griffiths (3rd January 2024) Interview with……..

Karadsheh, Jomana, and Heather Chen. “IDF Sniper Kills Two Women inside Gaza Church, Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem Says.” CNN, December 18, 2023. Available at:https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/16/middleeast/idf-sniper-gaza-church-deaths-intl-hnk/index.html.

James Elder UNICEF Spokesperson (19th December 2023) Press Statement

How MSF is responding to the war in Gaza (no date) Doctors Without Borders – USA. Available at: https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/our-response-israel-gaza-war (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

Glausiusz, J. (2024). Israel is flooding Gaza’s tunnel network: scientists assess the risks. Nature.

Lethal combination of hunger and disease to lead to more deaths in Gaza (no date) World Health Organization. Available at: https://www.who.int/news/item/21-12-2023-lethal-combination-of-hunger-and-disease-to-lead-to-more-deaths-in-gaza#:~:text=An%20unprecedented%2093%25%20of%20the,and%20high%20levels%20of%20malnutrition. (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

Buheji, M., & Buheji, B. (2024). Mitigating Risks of Slow Children Development Due to War on Gaza 2023. International Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, 14(1), 11-21.

3 questions to MSF: Antimicrobial Resistance in the ongoing Gaza War – 2023 (2023) ReAct. Available at: https://www.reactgroup.org/news-and-views/news-and-opinions/2023-2/3-questions-to-msf-antibiotic-resistance-in-the-ongoing-gaza-war/ (Accessed: 13 February 2024).

Neha Nouman

Maternal and child health (MCH) is a critical aspect of global health as it affects more than half of the world’s population and can create complications in pregnancy which can have severe impacts on both mother and child such as excessive blood loss, infections, and high blood pressures, with some cases being fatal. MCH can reflect the health status within the population and serve as an indicator of a nation’s development. The more developed a nation, the better MCH care they will have. Although it appears as though deaths from complications during childbirth, or due to complications during pregnancy have decreased by 38% over the last two decades, the vast inequalities that are present are not shown. More than half of the deaths that are related to MCH are found to happen in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, with them shouldering the burden of 86% of the global total in 2017 (Who/Yoshi Shimizu, 2024). India presents a unique case study to explore MCH, as there have been significant advancements in their healthcare system, but also notable challenges thus far.

Understanding Maternal and Child Health:

Maternal and child health focuses on the well-being of women during pregnancy, childbirth, and the postnatal period. It also focuses on the health of the child from birth onwards. MCH is a vital area of healthcare that needs to be focused on as it is pivotal in the area of global health because it aims to reduce both maternal and infant mortality whilst enhancing the health outcomes that can be produced to provide a nurturing environment for mothers and children. MCH encompasses access to relevant health services, nutritional guidance, disease prevention, and management of conditions. MCH can act as a key indicator of the health infrastructure that is in place in a country, as the better it is in a country the lower the complications that are associated with MCH. The health infrastructure therefore also can reflect the socio-economic developments and conditions in a nation. On an international level, the importance of MCH is underscored by its inclusion in global health objectives and initiatives, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which have been set by the United Nations to transform the world that we live in and fight systemic issues such as poverty and inequality. These goals emphasise the importance of universal access to quality maternal and child healthcare services which is essential for reducing healthcare disparities that are present within nations and overall improving health outcomes (Bhatia et al, 2021: Dhanwal & Choudhury, 2021).

Successes in India’s MCH Landscape

One of the most important goals that MCH targets aims to achieve is a reduction in both maternal and child mortality rates. India has successfully been able to achieve this goal and this has been a significant victory in their MCH landscape. The maternal mortality ratio saw a decline from 212 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2007 to 113 in 2016-2018 (Meh et al, 2021). Within 10 years, there was a 46.6% decrease in the mortality rate in India and this behaves as an indicator notifying us of the improving health conditions in the country. A reduction of almost half is a testament to the improved MCH healthcare services in India and the increased awareness and importance it is receiving as a healthcare unit. The reduction in mortality rates in India can be attributed to various initiatives and reforms that were implemented by the government over several years. One of the most influential programs has been the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) scheme which offers cash incentives to women to give birth in hospitals, in the hopes that by increasing institutional deliveries where there is medical attention and facilities, material mortality will reduce (NMH, 2024). The JSY has been able to provide a lens to explore inequality in healthcare in India. When focusing on different states in the country, there were varying degrees of success in maternal mortality reduction, which has highlighted the importance of regional strategies, but also addressed the issue in different states with specific solutions (Randive et al, 2014). This specific focus has allowed for an overall decrease in mortality rates as individual states have solutions that are tailored to them.

Another success in India’s MCH landscape is the technical innovations that they have implemented into their healthcare services. The use of mobile health technologies and telemedicine has been able to expand healthcare accessibility across the country in rural and urban areas alike, and this has had a significant impact on the enhancement of MCH care in India. The integration of technology in health care was part of a wider campaign namely ‘Digital India’ which has improved the efficiency of services in the nation (Joshi et al, 2020).

A third success that is seen in the MCH landscape in India, is the increased policy and community initiatives that have been implemented such as the National Rural Health mission. This has aimed to strengthen healthcare infrastructure all around the country, not only just in cities, to improve MCH outcomes. Rural areas tend to have weaker health infrastructure and the NRMH has attempted to focus on these states to improve the access they have to healthcare and reduce any disparities. It has had an emphasis on capacity building, and enhancing the skills of healthcare providers in an attempt to increase the quality of healthcare that is provided in remote areas (Sharma & Kamra, 2020; Geetha, 2020).

Failures in India’s MCH Landscape

Although there have been some successes in the work that India has been doing in improving the MCH care that is provided, it is arguably not enough with most reforms having occurred almost 20 years ago. One of the main failures remains arguable the disparities in health care access that still exist and are very much prevalent today. Although work has been done to combat this issue, not enough has been done in the context of an ever-growing population in a post-pandemic era. The rural-urban divide in healthcare access is very prominent in society in India and is often compounded by a lack of awareness and cultural barriers, leading to lower utilisation of maternal health services in rural areas compared to urban ones (Chauhan et al., 2022) directly lending to the fact that there are more MCH related health complications in rural areas. This issue is also seen from state to state and is not only limited to a rural-urban divide. Healthcare disparities are also present in different regions of the country, reflecting inequality amongst different states in terms of infrastructure and services provided (Bango & Gosh, 2022). Other socio-economic factors also play a role in access to MCH, with one of the most significant ones being the caste system that is present in India. Members of lower castes face challenges in accessing quality healthcare, and this is reflected by the lower utilisation of MCH services amongst disadvantaged social groups (Pakrashi et al, 2022). The government in India must implement improved policies that aim to reduce the overall inequality that is present within different areas of society.

Targeted interventions need to be implemented within India to ensure that women are gaining access to the healthcare that they need. Many women, especially in rural areas, face barriers to accessing healthcare due to financial constraints, transportation issues and limited healthcare infrastructure (Dhami et al, 2021), all of which significantly hinder their accessibility to healthcare. Societal norms have influenced women’s ability to seek healthcare independently, and gender disparities in the matter are evident from a young age and continue into adulthood (Jahangir & Sekker, 2023), meaning that more work needs to be done at the root of the problem to ensure that this unequal access does not continue to widen over time.

Takeaways

It is very clear to see that as a nation India has made advancements within the MCH they provide within their healthcare systems, with there being a significant decrease in maternal and child mortality rates in addition to an increase in the number of people using resources that are in place. Government schemes have proven to be effective over time however are now outdated and no longer apply to the modern world in which we live. There are still many issues that exist in India regarding MCH, and these include but are not limited to disparities in accessing healthcare within the rural-urban divide, or on a state-to-state basis. More work needs to be done to overcome socio-economic barriers and ensure that all mothers and children have access to the care that they need and deserve.

Bibliography

Bango, Madhumita and Soumitra Ghosh. “Social and Regional Disparities in Utilization of Maternal and Child Healthcare Services in India: A Study of the Post-National Health Mission Period.” Frontiers in Pediatrics 10 (2022): n. pag.

Bhatia, Mrigesh, Laxmi Kant Dwivedi, Kajori Banerjee, Alok Bansal, Misra Sib Ranjan and Priyanka Dixit. “Pro-poor policies and improvements in maternal health outcomes in India.” BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 21 (2021)

Chauhan, Nelia Lois, Devendra Raj Singh and Bharat Kumar. “Detriments and Utilisation of Maternal Health Care Services in Urban slums of Agra City.” Revista Review Index Journal of Multidisciplinary (2022): n. pag.

Dhami, Mansi Vijaybhai, Felix Akpojene Ogbo, Blessing Jaka Akombi-Inyang, Raphael Torome, Kingsley Emwinyore Agho and On Behalf Of The Global Maternal And Child Health. “Understanding the Enablers and Barriers to Appropriate Infants and Young Child Feeding Practices in India: A Systematic Review.” Nutrients 13 (2021): n. pag.

Dhanwal, Dr. Ashok Kumar and Maitri Chaudhuri. “A Comparative Study between Knowledge and Practice of New-Borne Care and Child Health Care by the Rural Mothers and to Seek its Relationship with the Selected Demographic Variables in Tripura, India.” Scholars Journal of Applied Medical Sciences (2021)

Geetha S, Dr.P.LOGANATHAN. “A Study on Maternal Health Care through Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) Namakkal District.” (2020).

Jahangir, Selim and T. V. Sekher. “Gender disparities in self-perceived health and subjective well-being among older adults in India: evidences from a large-scale survey.” SN Social Sciences 3 (2023): n. pag.

Joshi, Vinayak Vijay, N. A. Pawar and Swapna Acharya. “Digitalisation of Health Care in India: Initiatives and Challenges.” (2020).

Meh, Catherine, Abha Sharma, Usha Ram, Shaza A Fadel, Natasha Correa, John W. Snelgrove, Prakash Shah, Rehana Begum, Manoranjana Shah, Tommy Hana, Sze Hang Fu, Lucshman

Pakrashi, Debayan, Surya Nath Maiti and Sarani Saha. “Caste, Awareness and Inequality in Access to Maternal and Child Health Programs: Evidence From India.” Social Indicators Research163 (2022): 1301 – 1321.

Raveendran, Bhaskar Mishra and Prabhat Jha. “Trends in maternal mortality in India over two decades in nationally representative surveys.” Bjog 129 (2021): 550 – 561.

Randive, Bharat, Miguel San Sebastiån, Ayesha De Costa and Lars Lindholm. “Inequalities in institutional delivery uptake and maternal mortality reduction in the context of cash incentive program, Janani Suraksha Yojana: results from nine states in India.” Social science & medicine 123 (2014): 1-6 .

Sharma, Vijayetta and Pawan K. Kamra. “ACHIEVING MATERNAL HEALTH THROUGH JANANI SURAKSHA YOJANA UNDER NRHM:A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEME IN PUNJAB, NORTH INDIA.” International Journal of Advanced Research(2020): n. pag.

Aran Woo

Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms and an open-door policy in 1978, China’s economy has undergone unprecedented and rapid growth. The subsequent restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States, low exchange rates through the single currency system, and accession to the WTO attracted massive foreign capital inflows. China’s cheap labour and rents further solidified its position as the world’s factory.  

Internally, under the collective leadership of the Communist Party, China mirrored the post-World War II development patterns of many European countries by investing over 40% of its GDP in the development of social overhead capital (SOC). This internal growth efforts accelerated after the export slump that followed the 2008 global financial crisis. The real estate market, in particular, has grown to account for nearly 30% of GDP.  

Fuelling an unprecedented construction boom, China’s urbanisation rate, which stood at 19.7% in 1978, soared to 59.6% in 2018. Local governments, property construction companies, banks, and individual property owners all could profit immensely from this high demand. Financial instruments with low interest rates pumped out by local banks further stimulated investment and domestic demand, and the wealth generated from real estate flowed into financial markets to generate further wealth. This rapid economic growth propelled China to become the world’s second-largest economy, and some have predicted that it could surpass the United States in the near future.  

However, the coronavirus lockdown severely impacted China’s exports as the global economy contracted. Real estate, once a growth engine, plunged the country into a crisis. Property prices, which had been built recklessly without regard for demand, fell sharply, and many debt-financed construction projects were halted or abandoned, leaving 130 million homes vacant. 

In the meantime, many real estate companies faced a liquidity crisis as the Chinese government deleveraged the industry by regulating loan-to-value ratios in 2020 to ease the property bubble. Following Evergrande’s default in 2021, Country Garden, the top real estate developer in China, also defaulted on its dollar-denominated bonds last year. The decline in property demand proved fatal for Country Garden, which builds over 60% of its constructions in small and mid-sized cities. This crisis extended to other companies along the supply chain, banks, local governments, and related financial firms. 

Furthermore, China is losing momentum in its conventional growth model, marked by higher wages compared to the past and a diminishing birthrate. The working-age population, aged 16 to 59, peaked at 997 million in 2014 but fell to 876 million in 2022, a decline of more than 100 million. Compounding this issue is China’s declining birth rate, which reached 1.09 in 2022, pointing toward a concerning outlook for the country’s working-age population. Simultaneously, the growth in total factor productivity, a measure of a efficiency of factors in production, has only remained above 1%, while shrinking labour and lack of innovation have contributed to a widespread decline in corporate profits. 

The ongoing trade war with the US has exacerbated the challenges on China’s economy. The average tariff rate of 20% in the Trump administration has been maintained under the Biden administration, and Mexico dethroned China as the largest importer of the US. Intensifying the impact of the decline in global demand during pandemic, the trade war has severely hurt China’s export. Furthermore, China’s efforts to advance its artificial intelligence (AI) sector, crucial for its transition to a technology-intensive economy, face obstacles due to US government pressure on Nvidia to stop supplying $5 billion worth of AI semiconductors to China. 

Moreover, experts argue that President Xi’s strong regulation of domestic companies has increased investment risks. In contrast to Deng’s emphasis on market autonomy during the reform and opening-door era, Xi has prioritized socialist values, advocating for ‘common prosperity’. This approach has resulted in increased control over private enterprises, notably seen in the crackdown on Didi Chuxing and Alibaba for alleged anti-competitive practices. Both companies faced substantial fines, with Didi Chuxing being delisted from the US stock market, causing a sharp decline in Chinese big tech stock prices and prompting a significant withdrawal of foreign investors. 

Furthermore, Xi’s assertive diplomatic stance and territorial disputes with neighbouring countries have also disrupted geopolitical stability. Coupled with the aforementioned negative indicators, this has elevated uncertainty and investment risk in China, leading to capital outflows. Despite the strong performance of global equity market, foreign funds were net sellers of $2.6 billion in Chinese equities in January 2024, redirecting investments to other Asian countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and India. 

China predicted that the reopening in January 2023 would boost its domestic market to overcome its negative economic indicators. However, consumers who have suffered financial hardship for three years have not followed along these predictions. This contrasts with other countries that experienced aggregate demand shock and inflationary pressures. In China, where home prices constitute 59% of households’ total assets as of 2019, the decline in property values has significantly impacted tightened spending, amplifying deflationary fears. The increasing real debt burden on households, without a corresponding rise in prices, has dampened consumption, exacerbating deflationary trends. Specifically, the producer price index and consumer price index have been negative for 14 and 2 consecutive months respectively. The combination of shrinking disposable income and reduced consumer confidence has hindered China’s economic performance, falling short of expectations since the reopening. 

Additionally, Chinese youth face significant challenges with high unemployment. In June 2023, the youth unemployment rate was reported by the government at 21.3%, and not released since. However, the experts criticised that this is underestimated and that the figure rises to 46.5% when including millions of individuals who are unwilling to work and are not actively participating in the labour market. This alarming situation, where one in two young people is unemployed, results from a mismatch between supply and demand in the labour market.  

China is grappling with labour shortages in blue-collar and low-paying service jobs, but these are not the positions sought by Chinese college graduates. On the other hand, the tech companies desired by them are downsizing due to regulations, and the focus of companies on reducing debt rather than initiating new projects and job creation, further exacerbate the issue. Additionally, overseas companies are finding limited incentives to return. 

Widespread frustration with this deflation and unemployment is evident across Chinese society. Some homeowners are refusing to pay their mortgages, and data from Freedom House indicates 651 housing-related protests occurred in the six months from June 2023 as construction workers and homebuyers protested unpaid wages and falling prices. In response, the Chinese government has employed measures such as surveillance, detention, and censorship. 

Chinese youth are expressing their discontent through passive resistance, taking on jobs as day labourers, or opting out of the economy by joining Tang Ping(躺平) movement. The government has urged youth to be flexible about jobs and called for patience, but deflation coupled with strict coronavirus lockdowns has built up social discontent. Numerous Western media outlets caution that China’s prolonged economic downturn may lead to widespread social discontent and pose a crisis for the Communist Party’s political system. 

The Chinese government has officially denied deflationary concerns and worked to manage public opinion while implementing measures to stimulate the economy. The loan prime rate (LRP), serving as the interest rate, has remained unchanged for the fifth consecutive month, following a modest decline. This move is considered lukewarm but reflects the government’s apprehension about potential overheating in the real estate market and the depreciation of the yuan. The government also unveiled plans to boost the stock market, including a reduction in stamp duty. In addition, reports from Bloomberg indicate that the Chinese government will inject $27.8 billion into the market to stabilise it. Furthermore, the head of People’s Bank of China announced a 0.5% reduction in the deposit reserve requirement ratio from February 5^th to enhance liquidity. 

To prevent deflation from evolving into a prolonged recession, essential changes are necessary to rebuild market confidence and alleviate reduced consumer sentiment resulting from excessive government control. This means that it may be a difficult task to overcome the crisis without clear steps toward business deregulation and aligning practices with international standards to address internal and external uncertainties. 

China’s rapid economic growth, US restraint, subsequent property bubble burst, and ageing population draws comparisons to the beginning of Japan’s three lost decades. However, China’s situation appears even more challenging. The country finds itself falling into the middle-income trap, with a GDP per capita of $12,850, below the World Bank’s threshold for high-income nations. In contrast, Japan had a per capita GDP of $45,000 just before its economic bubble burst in the late 1980s. If China fails to address its current challenges promptly, it risks experiencing a longer and more severe economic downturn than Japan’s. Indeed, global markets are closely observing China’s next moves. 

Bibliography 

Bloomberg. (2024, January 23). China mulls stock market rescue package backed by $278 billion. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-23/china-mulls-stock-market-rescue-package-backed-by-278-billion?leadSource=uverify%20wall. 

Brands, H., & Beckley, M. (2022). Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China. W.W. Norton & Company. 

Freedom House. (n.d.). China Dissent Monitor. Retrieved January 25, 2024, from https://chinadissent.net. 

Krugman, P. (2024, January 18). China’s Economy Is in Serious Trouble. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/18/opinion/china-economy-xi.html#:~:text=Some%20analysts%20expected%20the%20Chinese,supposedly%20grew%20by%205.2%20percent. 

Wright, L. (2023). Grasping Shadows: The Politics of China’s Deleveraging Campaign. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/grasping-shadows-politics-chinas-deleveraging-campaign. 

Zhao, W., & Ruet, J. (2021). Managing the “Post Miracle” Economy in China: Crisis of Growth Model and Policy Responses. Post-Communist Economies, 33(7), 820-841. doi: 10.1080/14631377.2020.1867427. 

Zhen, S. (2024, February 6). Foreign funds sold net US$2.6 bln of China equities in Jan – Morgan Stanley. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/foreign-funds-sold-net-us26-bln-china-equities-jan-morgan-stanley-2024-02-06/. 

Freya Kinsey

With the notorious Christmas Eve address of 2020, Boris Johnson announced that the United Kingdom would no longer be participating in the Erasmus+ programme as part of the Brexit deal to formally separate from the European Union. The news was received with shock and trepidation by students and educators around the country, as just 12 months earlier, Johnson had assured MPs that Brexit posed “no threat” to the UK’s participation in the Erasmus+ programme. The government unveiled its plans to implement a new, uniquely British replacement, the Turing Scheme, named for the father of modern computer science, with the first cohort set to undertake their global mobility placements in September 2021. On the 3^rd of January 2024, the Department for Education published its first evaluation report of the Turing Scheme. This report officially codified the misgivings of the education and youth sector that had been expressed since the scheme’s inception: that in terms of effectiveness, reach, and long-term viability, the Turing Scheme is not a worthy replacement for what has been lost.

To be sure, the Department for Education’s report highlights the positive experiences of Turing Scheme participants: students who undertook a mobility placement in 2021/2022 reported that they felt the experience had improved their communication skills and ability to problem solve. 91% of HE and 80% of FE/VET participants also felt as if the experience had improved their future career prospects. However, these benefits are neither new nor unique to the Turing Scheme; Erasmus+ participants interviewed in 2021 reported similar levels of satisfaction with the impact of their mobility on their personal development and career prospects, highlighting that these benefits come from the experience of studying or working abroad. 

A purported aim of the Turing Scheme was to improve funding opportunities for the most disadvantaged students to undertake placements abroad. Robert Halfon, Minister for Skills, Apprenticeships and Higher Education, has described the scheme as “a real game-changer for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, empowering them with transformative opportunities abroad, a chance to experience other cultures, and learn vital skills for life and work.” Yet, evidence from the report highlights that the Turing Scheme has failed to meet this goal, particularly in the Higher Education (HE) sector.  HE providers are frustrated by the lack of transparency on how funds are allocated, with some institutions receiving very different amounts of funding for the 2021-22 versus the 2022-2023 cohorts. Some students who were allocated funding also reported not receiving any payments until they were already abroad, or even until they had already returned home from their placement, requiring students to source alternative means of funding their mobility placements. The lack of consistency in available funds and in the payment timeline means that institutions cannot guarantee any amount of financial support to their students to undertake a mobility placement before beginning the application process, causing some students from disadvantaged backgrounds to drop out of their placements due to a lack of funds and dissuading others from applying at all. This poses a particular problem for the future of university courses for which a year abroad forms an essential and compulsory component, such as modern foreign languages, which are already vulnerable to budget cuts and falling student numbers.

The findings also revealed serious issues with the timeliness of the application process. Most higher education providers have found the application process difficult, lengthy, and confusing. It was common for providers, particularly in higher education, to report that the window of time required to complete the application form was too short (6 weeks for HE providers and 8 weeks for Further Education/Vocation Education Training providers). The application window also falls over the Easter period, obliging staff to continue working during a period of annual leave. Furthermore, students do not receive confirmation of their places until July, a time in which most teaching at UK institutions has been suspended for the summer, leaving them without the support of staff or scrambling to find visas and accommodation at the last minute. Likewise, the timeframe does not account for the varying start dates for the academic year in countries around the world, which often begin as early as July or August, giving students little time to get their affairs in order before uprooting their lives to move abroad.  

Finally, the fact that the Turing Scheme is not a reciprocal programme calls into question its long-term viability as a replacement for Erasmus+ and the fate of international partnerships with UK institutions. Unlike Erasmus+, the Turing Scheme only facilitates the outgoing mobility of British students, without offering support for inbound students wishing to study or undertake placements in the UK. Keele University’s dean of internationalisation, Anita Hayes, questions, “How can we foster our international collaborations in teaching and researchS if we cannot support our partners to visit our campuses?” The lack of facilities for mutual exchange is emblematic of the government’s myopic approach to international partnerships post-Brexit. Reliance on the goodwill and hospitality of partners abroad to offer placements for British students without offering anything in return is not a sustainable system. If the government is truly committed to promoting the image of a ‘global Britain,’  it is imperative that the concerns of those in the youth and education sectors are listened to and that significant improvements are made to the delivery of the Turing Scheme.

Bibliography

Education, Directorate-General for. “Erasmus+ Annual Report 2021.” Publications Office of the EU, January 1, 1970. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ff16650b-7b6e-11ed-9887-01aa75ed71a1.

Lewis, Joe. ‘The Turing Scheme.’ August 30 2023. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9141/

Kenny, Neil and Barnes, Harriet. ‘Language learning: turning a crisis into an opportunity.’ The British Academy. April 28 2019. 35. Language learning: turning a crisis into an opportunity | The British Academy, pp.12-13.

Grove, Jack. “Aberdeen set to close language degrees as recruitment nosedives,” Times Higher Education. November 30 2023. Aberdeen set to close language degrees | Times Higher Education (THE)

British Universities’ International Liaison Association. “Turing funding timeline in UK causing participants to drop out.’ January 5 2024.  Turing funding timeline in UK causing participants to drop out | BUILA

Colleges Scotland. ‘Colleges Scotland – Turing Scheme Update for Education, Children and Young People Committee.’ May 2023. https://www.parliament.scot/-/media/files/committees/education-children-and-young-people-committee/correspondence/2023/colleges-scotland–turing-scheme-update-for-education-children-and-young-people-committee–may-2023.pdf

Department for Education and Halfon MP, The Rt Hon Robert. “Turing Scheme boosts global placements beyond Europe.” January 3 2024. Turing Scheme boosts global placements beyond Europe – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Morgan, John. 2020. ‘PM says UK ‘will continue to participate’ in Erasmus+.’ Times Higher Education. January 15 2020. PM says UK ‘will continue to participate’ in Erasmus+ | Times Higher Education (THE)

IFF Research. “Turing Scheme: Year 1 evaluation.’ Turing Scheme: Year 1 evaluation (publishing.service.gov.uk) 2024. Research report

Martin, Kim. 2024. ‘Turing funding timeline in UK causing participants to drop out.’ The Pie News. January 5 2024. Turing analysis echoes sector concerns (thepienews.com)

Vittoria Digilio

On January 1, 2024, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), an essential core of the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, ceased to exist. The dissolution was established through a decree on September 28, 2023, as a condition for a ceasefire ending Azerbaijan’s military operation of September 19-20, 2023. These events have significant implications for international power politics dynamics: both the South Caucasus region and relations with Western actors, such as the European Union, are affected.

It is a pickle to reassess the future geopolitical realignment of the region with Baku wanting to play a leading role in the development of the South Caucasus, which requires diplomatic dialogue with Russia and Iran, and a lack of clarity of whether these two countries will get along. Russia had a longstanding tradition as an Armenian ally due to the ideological importance of the region, as it was fundamental for Russian integration in the post-Cold War period while both countries are the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a common defence pact. However, the Kremlin re-evaluated its relationship in favour of Azerbaijan, after Armenia’s governmental election in 2018, whose winners changed the course towards Europe and the West, namely by ratifying the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal Court. This was something which Vladimir Putin, the subject of an ICC arrest warrant, strongly opposed.

Indeed, after negotiating the ceasefire during the second Karabakh War, in November 2020, relations between Moscow and Baku strengthened. The Russian mediation agreed on territorial concessions to Azerbaijan and imposed military presence on the Nagorno-Karabakh region, through the mobilisation of 2000 peacekeepers, who agreed to remain until 2044. Eventually, Russia adopted a position of neutrality and acquiescence, allowing a 10-month blockade of the Lancin Corridor, the road linking Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia, impeding the passage of people and resources; and most evidently recent attacks in September 2023. It is probably more than a coincidence that the offensive took place when Armenia was organising military exercises with American contingents. Moreover, the mediation of the 2020 confrontation marked a normative change in the international framework, giving way to a state-centric imposition of a “negative peace” which relies on the use of force and state coercion – crucial for the dénouement of events.

The temporary conflict’s conclusion marks apparent shifts in power relations in the Caucasus region, which is often referred to as a bridge between Asia and Europe, and where tensions between Russia, Western states and other regional powers manifest themselves. This indeed brings into the picture other actors involved, particularly Turkey and the European Union. Ankara has ambitious interests in the creation of the Zangezur Corridor, a transport route which would link mainland Azerbaijan with Armenia’s West, neighbouring Turkey and Iran. A passage crossing Armenian provinces would be, by definition, militarised and consequently, it would breach Yerevan’s territorial sovereignty. The coercive nature of the implementation of the plan is obviously concerning, and if the Corridor came to a realisation, the strategic geography of the South Caucasus would be modified, solidifying the revanchist policies of two neo-imperial actors, namely Turkey and Russia.

The European Union is also involved and has an interest in collaborating in the creation of an enduring peaceful settlement; however, it finds itself in an uncomfortable position sending mixed signals to the parties involved. There are four main reasons for this confusion. First, not all members of the Union support the same cause or not as strongly as their partners. For instance, France has been the only country sending military assistance to Armenia, hosting Europe’s largest Armenian diaspora community. Second, since the EU has to consider the new energy deals with Azerbaijan offering a non-Russian source of fossil fuels and gas, many members have been prepared to turn a blind eye and downplay criticism of the regime’s human rights record. Third, Baku has now long engaged in the so-called ‘caviar diplomacy’ by leveraging its wealth of resources namely asserting itself as a valuable partner, through a lobbying strategy, which consists of lavish hospitality and costly invitations to influence European politicians. And lastly, the allies of Western powers, such as Israel, did quietly help Azerbaijan’s campaign to recapture the contended region, through the supply of weapons. Moreover, the increased spending in Azerbaijan’s defence budget, going from 700-800$ million in 2022 to 1.5$ billion in 2024 raises concerns of a full-scale invasion of Armenia.

Overall, the current ending of the conflict has begged many questions concerning the future framework of geopolitics. While The Republic of Armenia remains at risk, no longer sided by its traditional guardian and protector, Russia is subtly shifting its look towards Azerbaijan. Yet due to a fight on the Ukrainian front, Russia moves carefully with full awareness that a small misstep would cause a loss of leverage in the South Caucasus region and push Baku closer to Iran or Turkey. On the other hand, Ankara is trying to benefit from the Kremlin’s hesitation to seal its alliance with Baku and position itself as the key regional relations broker. Finally, the presence of regional powers imposing their preferences through military coercion put the European Union in an uncertain position, as it tries to mediate the parties while preserving its energy interests.

Bibliography: 

Broers, Laurence, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: The life and death of an unrecognized state”, EurasiaNet, January 2, 2024 https://eurasianet.org/the-nagorno-karabakh-republic-the-life-and-death-of-an-unrecognized-state 

David,        Lewis,        Discussion paper ‘European Union support to the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process: new regional and global challenges’, published by Conciliation Resources, (London), January 2023. 

Debre, Isabel, “Israeli arms quietly helped Azerbaijan retake Nagorno-Karabakh, to the dismay of region’s Armenians”, AP News, October 5, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-weaponsisrael-6814437bcd744acc1c4df0409a74406c  

Kayali, Laura, and Gavin, Gabriel, “France sends weapons to Armenia amid fears of new conflict with Azerbaijan”, Politico, October 23, 2023 https://www.politico.eu/article/france-armenia-fear-conflict-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-zangezur/ 

Ohanyan, Anna, “Azerbaijan’s Armenian ‘Corridor’ Is a Challenge to the Global Rules-Based Order”, Foreign Policy, November 2, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/02/azerbaijan-armenia-zangezur-corridor/ 

Tocci, Nathalie, “Rise and fall of geopolitical Europe”, Politico, November 16,2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/rise-and-fall-geopolitical-europe-ukraine-russiaisrael-palestine-commission/ 

Valencia, Matthew, “Caviar Diplomacy in Azerbaijan”, The Economist,  August 31, 2016, https://www.economist.com/1843/2016/08/31/caviar-diplomacy-in-azerbaijan  

Charles Hyde

“The good thing about homeopathy is that it doesn’t work, so you don’t get any nasty side effects!” – Unknown.

It is a tough time to be the most widely prescribed anti-depressant. In 2022, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) were found to not function as we thought, hampering serotonin’s reputation as The Happy Chemical (Davey 2022). Maybe this sounds like cause to panic, as everywhere we turn the words “mental health crisis” blare out, but this is why the chemical imbalance narrative of mental illness needs to lose its reputation too. At best, SSRIs work 25% better than a placebo, but the placebo alone can change your mood. Forgetting drugs for a second: fixing your sleep-wake cycle is three times more effective than the best anti-depressants in improving mood (Walker 2017). Yet we are sleeping less and ailing more (Mental Health Foundation 2023). 25% of the UK population is experiencing some mental health issue and medication is still the most common treatment (Mind 2017). Clearly, we have something backwards. Once we stop seeing mental health as purely chemical, important structural factors come into play, something preventative health measures must recognise going forwards.

Embodied trauma and chronic unemployment.

Did you know that if paracetamol were created today, it would not be approved for sale? It doesn’t do enough beyond the placebo effect to be a worthy drug, yet it is the drug we use the most (Nutt 2012). There is no room for such a mind-body connection in a purely chemical view of health, which is odd considering it isn’t news to modern science. In the early 1900s, a group of doctors convinced their patients that a metal radiator rod was a new miracle treatment, and after waving it around the affected areas of the patient’s body, found that they reported less pain (Van Der Kolk 2017). Temporary? Perhaps, but so is paracetamol. Similar to the rod, the act of taking a pill has real power, like ritual.

Those patients treated with radiator rods usually reported vague pains, like musculoskeletal issues (MSK), a diagnosis that is often given without knowing what is the cause (Van der Kolk 2017). More recently, MSK issues affect 30% of the UK population (NHS 2023), rising to 50% when looking at the chronically ill and unemployed (ONS 2022). Scrap metal might not be the answer, but the mind may still be playing a part. Van der Kolk writes that MSK symptoms can be the manifestation of mental health problems. He writes that issues like PTSD, anxiety and depression can tighten the muscles, inflame the brain, raise blood pressure, suppress the immune system, damage digestion and more.

For perspective, these are all symptoms reported by the chronically ill and unemployed. This group was 2.1 million strong in 2019 but this has risen to 2.6 million by 2023 (ONS 2023). Mental health issues and MSK issues are most reported, with 1.38 million people (53%) suffering depression, anxiety or other nerve issues, and 1.35 million suffering MSK issues. Most of the new additions since 2019 report at least one mental health problem, while 38% report five or more conditions including MSK and mental health. Considering Van der Kolk’s findings that personal psychological experience can trigger symptoms

reported to the ONS (also including brain fog, digestion issues, hypertension, worsened allergies etc), a link feels likely when we consider the experiences we have shared since 2019.

Pandemic Pandemonium.

500,000 more people have registered as chronically ill and unemployed since 2019 (ONS 2023). Some doctors are worried that this rise is because we are medicalising day-to-day stresses and anxieties (The Economist 2023). However, the last four years included a global pandemic and national lockdown, corrupt and incompetent politics (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2022), the threat and effects of climate change, the instability of Brexit and the related concoction of a faux culture war (Duffy 2021), and more recently the cost-of-living crises and two major conflicts in the Global North. We learn about current affairs looking down at the small screens of our phones, and on social media, with both the size of our screen and the social media algorithms causing anxiety and brain fog (Huberman Labs 2021). In those four years, the ONS (2022) has found that depression has jumped from affected 1 in 10 people to 1 in 6 people. Clearly the structures around us are sick, so how do we treat them?

At least some of these stressors could be eased if the government took inequality a bit more seriously. According to the NHS (2023), ‘Black or Black British’ people were over four times as likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act than ‘White British’. The ONS (2022) found that unpaid carers are nearly twice as likely to report depression than non-carers (37% against 17%), and those having trouble with rent, mortgage, credit or energy bills can be two or three times as likely to develop depression than those without. Yet the government rhetoric has been that the benefits system is rife with fraud (fraud sits at below 5%) (Department of Work and Pensions 2023). Their issue seems to be specifically that these people are unemployed and need to get back to work as soon as possible. Except these people are not even really ill in the way we currently think – they don’t necessarily have mental issues, but very real material issues.

What we learn about ourselves.

Perhaps an education system better tailored to living our lives would help. How much money and time could be saved if functional knowledge was more common – DIY repair work, navigating the job market and financial world, taxes, digital literacy. Maybe the traditional curriculum could teach us how to take care of our body and mind: how our behaviours affect our mental states, how our mental states affect our biology, how the chemistry of cooking can alter our mood and wellness etc. Just like the ONS reports separate mental health problems from physical health problems, our school subjects are clearly divided. Perhaps it’s efficient, but it means PSHE grows yearly to try to fill in the gaps left by a system which separates education from life. The LSE (2023) found that mental health costs the UK £117 billion annually in intervention and lost productivity – how much of this would be better spent in pre-emptive upskilling? Instead of just trying to reduce unequal access to education as it is, we need to update it – an overlapping education for our overlapping problems – building competence and confidence. After all, we may need more generalists than specialists to fix the future (Epstein 2019), and we better start soon.

Bibliography

Calvert, J. and Arbuthnott, G. (2021). Failures of State: the inside story of Britain’s battle with Coronavirus. London: Harper Collins Publishers.

Davey, C. (2022). The Chemical Imbalance Theory of Depression Is Dead – but That Doesn’t Mean Antidepressants Don’t Work | Christopher Davey. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/aug/03/the-chemical-imbalance-theory-of-depression-is-dead-but-that-doesnt-mean-antidepressants-dont-work.

Department of Work and Pensions (2023). Fraud and Error in the Benefit system: Financial Year 2022 to 2023 Estimates. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fraud-and-error-in-the-benefit-system-financial-year-2022-to-2023-estimates.

Duffy, B. (2021). The Generation Myth. Basic Books.

Epstein, D. (2019). Range : Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World. New York: Riverhead Books.

Huberman Labs (2021). ADHD & How Anyone Can Improve Their Focus – Huberman Lab. [online] http://www.hubermanlab.com. Available at: https://www.hubermanlab.com/episode/adhd-and-how-anyone-can-improve-their-focus [Accessed 27 Dec. 2023].

Mental Health Foundation (2023). UK adults report poorer sleep, seeing friends less often and exercising less as financial strain takes its toll – new survey results. [online] http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk. Available at: https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/about-us/news/new-survey-results-report-concerns-due-financial-strain.

NHS (2022). Mental Health Act Statistics, Annual Figures, 2021-22. [online] NHS Digital. Available at: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-health-act-statistics-annual-figures/2021-22-annual-figures#highlights.

NHS (2023). NHS England» Musculoskeletal health. [online] http://www.england.nhs.uk. Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/elective-care-transformation/best-practice-solutions/musculoskeletal/#:~:text=They%20can%20range%20from%20minor.

Nutt, D. (2012). Drugs — without the Hot Air : Minimising the Harms of Legal and Illegal Drugs. Cambridge: UIT.

Office for National Statistics (2022). Cost of Living and Depression in adults, Great Britain – Office for National Statistics. [online] http://www.ons.gov.uk. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/mentalhealth/articles/costoflivinganddepressioninadultsgreatbritain/29septemberto23october2022.

McDaid, D. (2022). Mental Health Problems Cost UK Economy at Least £118 Billion a Year – New Research. [online] London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/News/Latest-news-from-LSE/2022/c-Mar-22/Mental-health-problems-cost-UK-economy-at-least-118-billion-a-year-new-research#:~:text=Mental%20health%20problems%20cost%20the.

The Economist (2023). How to stop over-medicalising mental health. [online] The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/12/07/how-to-stop-over-medicalising-mental-health

Ada Pia Visciotti

On November 15, 2023, the international community witnessed the formal signing of the Samoa Agreement. This pivotal accord, set to redefine the contours of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS), was marked by the presence of distinguished figures such as Samoa’s Prime Minister, Hon Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, OACPS Secretary-General Georges Chikoti, and the EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, H.E. Jutta Urpilainen. Signifying a new chapter in EU-OACPS relations, this treaty stands as a successor to the Cotonou Agreement, heralding a new era of engagement and cooperation between all countries involved.

Following the extensive negotiations leading to this moment, did the signing ceremony fulfill its expected outcome? Not entirely.

The signing ceremony revealed an almost ironic twist: the lack of signatures from 35 of the 79 OACPS member states, most notably significant regional powers like Nigeria, Rwanda, and Jamaica. Many perceive these stances as significant in the broader context of these states’ strategic international positioning. Historically, relationships between African states and external powers were characterised by dependency and a lack of assertiveness. However, this dynamic is shifting. African states, along with their Caribbean and Pacific counterparts, are now exercising greater diplomatic leverage. Notably, the EU’s efforts at diplomatic capacity building within these states have partly enabled this newfound assertiveness.

In considering the recent developments surrounding the Samoa Agreement, it is imperative to delve into the factors that called for prolonged negotiations between the respective parties. Initially set to lapse in February 2020, The Cotonou Agreement saw its terms extended, a testament to the intricate nature of the diplomatic dialogues. These extensive discussions reached a pivotal juncture on July 20, 2023, with a decisive move by the Council of the European Union. The Council’s approval paved the way for the endorsement and provisional implementation of the partnership agreement.

Internal stalemates within the Council are not a new occurrence, but they have a significant impact on the international credibility of the EU in the geo-economic, political, and strategic contexts. The blockage on the agreement came from the Hungarian positioning. From a geo-economic perspective, Hungary’s resistance to the Samoa Agreement was a strategic move to maintain its leverage in ongoing discussions about EU funding, especially in light of the EU’s frozen funds over concerns about democratic backsliding. This indicated a tactical approach by Hungary to use the agreement as a bargaining chip in broader negotiations with the EU. Politically, Hungary’s objections were centered around specific clauses in the agreement, such as those promoting non-discrimination, LGBTQ+ rights, and gender equality. The government’s stance resonated with a conservative electorate skeptical of “gender education for minors” and the promotion of migration, as articulated by Balázs Orbán, a leading Hungarian political figure.

Now that unanimity at the European level has been achieved, the already announced concerns of the counterparts come to the forefront. These concerns are deeply rooted in the nature of the agreement itself, which is divided into six pillars. Among these, the pillars focusing on human rights, democracy and governance, and migration and mobility appear to be causing the most significant issues. In the context of these concerns, Nigeria’s approach to the agreement is particularly noteworthy. While Nigeria did not sign the agreement during the initial ceremony, it is undertaking a thorough review to assess how the agreement aligns with its national laws and interests. This careful scrutiny by Nigeria is partly in response to the apprehensions raised by a coalition of civil society organizations. These organizations have advised the Nigerian government against signing the agreement, arguing that it could lead to significant shifts in social norms, particularly regarding LGBTQ+ rights. They contend that the agreement, with its emphasis on non-discrimination and gender equality, might be at odds with Nigeria’s existing legal and societal frameworks.

The agreement brings to light another area of contention, migration. The EU’s approach to migration governance within the framework of the agreement has been characterized by a focus on the swift repatriation of irregular migrants. This emphasis reflects a security-centric perspective, often overshadowing the developmental and humanitarian facets of migration. Such an approach has encountered resistance from African states, who view the EU’s model as misaligned with the complexities of migration in their contexts. African governments have expressed concerns about the societal and human rights implications of the proposed readmission mechanisms, particularly in light of the potential infringement on the rights of their citizens. This issue has become a focal point in the negotiations, revealing a disconnect between the EU’s securitized migration policy and the developmental priorities of African countries.

Considering the challenges and negotiations surrounding the Samoa Agreement, it is crucial to understand the necessity for the EU to finalize this partnership agreement. The agreement’s significance extends beyond diplomatic formalities; it represents a crucial legal and economic framework for the EU’s engagement with the 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. The post-Cotonou Agreement provides the legal basis for the European Investment Bank (EIB) to lend in the OACPS countries. Without this legal framework, the EIB’s operations outside the EU could be significantly curtailed, undermining the EU’s strategic economic interests. This is particularly pertinent as the EU positions its Global Gateway infrastructure investment plan as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road initiative. The ability to invest and maintain economic influence in the OACPS region is crucial for the EU’s global strategic positioning.

In conclusion, the Samoa Agreement, despite its complexities and challenges, is a testament to the shifting dynamics of power. The Agreement’s finalization will signify the EU’s ability to adapt and respond to new geopolitical realities, balancing its internal complexities with its external ambitions. As such, the conclusion of the Samoa Agreement is not just a diplomatic necessity but a strategic imperative for the European Union in its quest to remain a relevant and influential player on the global stage.

Bibliography

Carbone, Maurizio. 2021. “The Rationales behind the EU-OACPS Agreement: Process, Outcome, Contestations.” European Foreign Affairs Review 26, no. Issue 2: 243–64. https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021018.

Carbone, Maurizio. 2022. “Double Two-Level Games and International Negotiations: Making Sense of Migration Governance in EU-Africa Relations.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 30 (4): 750–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.2106954.

“Flags African Union European Union Stand Stock Photo 2166931723.” Shutterstock. Accessed December 13, 2023. https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flags-african-union-european-stand-council-2166931723.

Haastrup, Toni, Niall Duggan, and Luis Mah. 2021. “Navigating Ontological (in)Security in EU–Africa Relations.” Global Affairs 7, no. 4: 541–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.1981144.

“Holdouts overshadow EU’s new partnership with Africa, Caribbean, Pacific”. http://Www.devex.com. Accessed December 8, 2023. https://www.devex.com/news/holdouts-overshadow-eu-s-new-partnership-with-africa-caribbean-pacific-105933.

“How Hungary is keeping Brussels’ post-Cotonou agreement in the limbo”. http://Www.devex.com. Accessed December 8, 2023. https://www.devex.com/news/how-hungary-is-keeping-brussels-post-cotonou-agreement-in-limbo-101977.

“Hungary digs in against Europe’s Africa-Caribbean-Pacific deal”. http://Www.devex.com. Accessed December 8, 2023. https://www.devex.com/news/hungary-digs-in-against-europe-s-africa-caribbean-pacific-deal-10520.

“Samoa agreement: EU and its member states sign new partnership”. http://Www.consilium.europa.eu. Accessed December 8, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/15/samoa-agreement-eu-and-its-member-states-sign-new-partnership-agreement-with-the-members-of-the-organisation-of-the-african-caribbean-and-pacific-states/.

Gabriela Treviño

“Our kids are gonna be reading at the speed of light!” exclaims Ms. Teges, a young and optimistic teacher on the satirical sitcom Abbott Elementary, during a meeting about the new reading software the fictional school district is mandating. After a series of mishaps and learning curves, the episode ends with the principal grabbing iPads out of the teachers’ hands and explaining, “The software we’ve been using was invented by the Pennsylvania penal system to collect data for prisons…Something about the correlation between lower reading levels and the amount of prison beds they’re supposed to build…Apparently it’s illegal!”

Naturally, Abbott Elementary is meant to be a humorous look at the reality of public schools in America, and the claim that prisons use school data to determine capacity, which has been challenged due to the lack of concrete evidence.1 However, this exchange highlights the murky and fraught relationship between legality, data, and privacy that school principals, administrators and district leaders must contend with due to the ever-expanding education technology, or ed-tech landscape. Specifically, this exchange illuminates the tension between data collection in the name of learning, questions of privacy and surveillance of students, and federal (lack of) guidance for school leaders.

Digital learning platforms and ed-tech have been used in classrooms since the inception of the internet, but the COVID-19 pandemic exponentially accelerated their use to facilitate distance-learning. According to the EdTech Top 40’s Fall 2018 report (published by the for-profit ed-tech company Instructure), during the 2017-2018 school year, US school districts used 548 digital learning products per month on average. 2 That number nearly tripled to an average of 1,417 products per month for the 2021-2022 school year. 3 As more and more ed-tech products are used and mandated by schools, the amount of data collected about students multiplies. That plethora of data then becomes harder to protect from third parties, such as private companies and non-educational institutions.

Not only do ed-tech platforms gather basic student information such as name, date of birth, or other personal details, but many also collect metadata, or data that results from how, when, and where a platform is used. 4 A new methodology called Educational Data Mining (EDM) has emerged to scour this abundance of data for new insights about students, how they learn, and their educational environments. EDM has enabled researchers to address everything, from understanding student motivation to building predictive models of student learning. However, this innovation has a dark underbelly. A recent report from Internet Safety Labs found that a whopping 96% of ed-tech apps share student data with third parties. 5 It also found that 28% of the ed-tech recommended by schools is not education-specific, meaning they could lack the regulatory protections that education-specific programs have.

Here we must ask ourselves: Why do these statistics matter? What concerns arise when we consider the convergence of students’ privacy, third-party ed-tech data collection, and EDM use of that data? First, there is the issue of consent, considering that data collection is not always consensual. The collection and production of data is often a one-way street that often lacks the explicit and informed consent of the user, especially if that user is a child using an ed-tech program required by their school. 6 It is also difficult for parents to consent on behalf of their child as they are often not involved in conversations around the ed-tech platforms used and privacy concerns.7 Another concern is that the data collected and integrated into predictive learning models is often biased.8 One research study found that algorithmic bias often occurs when data collection from/about one group of learners is applied to a different group (usually of a marginalized identity).9 Finally, excessive data collection is a tool of surveillance capitalism which seeks to study and alter our behavior for the profit gain of corporations.

Given these concerns, it is troubling that American federal education policy has minimal guidance to offer principals and administrators when it comes to navigating ed-tech and privacy. The central education privacy policy in the US is the Family and Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which allows parents and students the right to access Personally Identifiable Information (PII) collected by an educational institution and the right not to have PII made available to third parties without consent. Crucially, FERPA was passed in 1974 when most student records were kept in brick-and-mortar offices. The last time it was updated was in 2001, and none of its official amendments included considerations for privacy in the digital age. The second most important policy relating to children’s online privacy is the Federal Trade Commission’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which was also enacted before the advent of ed-tech and data mining. While both FERPA and COPPA discuss the protection of PII, both policies precede the widespread collection and use of PII, testing data, and metadata by third parties and private companies. Can metadata be considered PPI? How can school leaders tell how ed-tech platforms are using students’ data? Does the consent required by FERPA look different in the digital age? The lack of policy clarity around these questions makes school leaders’ decisions about which ed-tech platforms to use even more difficult.

It is crucial for policy makers to consider the social realities and consequences of the prolific collection of students’ data within the ed-tech ecosystem when crafting new education privacy policies. There is no question that ed-tech is here to stay and will continue to be a part of the everyday lives of students and teachers. However, until there are more robust privacy policies and guidance, the challenge and burden of keeping students and their data protected from overreaching third parties falls unfairly on the shoulders of principals, administrators, and district leaders.

Bibliography

Baker, Ryan S., and Kalina Yacef. “The State of Educational Data Mining in 2009: A Review and Future Visions.” Educational Data Mining 1, no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 3–17. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3554658.

Baker, Ryan S., and Aaron Hawn. “Algorithmic Bias in Education.” International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education 32, no. 4 (November 18, 2021): 1052–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40593-021-00285-9.

Brunson, Quinta, Brian Rubenstein, Justin Tan, and Joya McCrory. “New Tech.” Delicious Non-Sequitur Productions; 20th Television; Warner Bros. Television, January 18, 2022.

Colebatch, Hal. “Thinking about Policy: Finding the Best Way.” ResearchGate, January 1, 2006. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228470362_Thinking_about_policy_finding_the_best_way.

Herold, Benjamin. “Google under Fire for Data-Mining Student Email Messages.” Education Week, March 13, 2014. https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/google-under-fire-for-data-mining-student-email-messages/2014/03.

Instructure. “EdTech Top 40: Fall 2018 Report,” 2018. https://www.instructure.com/resources/research-reports/edtech-top-40-fall-2018-report?filled.

Instructure. “EdTech Top 40: Fall 2022 Report,” 2022https://www.instructure.com/resources/research-reports/edtech-top-40-fall-2022-report?filled.

Klein, Alyson. “Ed Tech Usage Is Up. So Are Parent Privacy Concerns.” Education Week, November 16, 2021. https://www.edweek.org/technology/ed-tech-usage-is-up-so-are-parent-privacy-concerns/2021/11.

Klein, Alyson. “The Number of Ed-Tech Tools School Districts Use Has Almost Tripled. That’s a Problem.” Education Week, August 29, 2022. https://www.edweek.org/technology/the-number-of-ed-tech-tools-school-districts-use-has-almost-tripled-thats-a-problem/2022/08.

Knapp, Irene, and Lisa LeVasseur. “K-12 Edtech Safety Benchmark: National Findings – Part 1.” Internet Safety Labs, December 13, 2022. https://internetsafetylabs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2022-k12-edtech-safety-benchmark-national-findings-part-1.pdf

“Legislative History of Major FERPA Provisions.” Student Privacy Policy Office. U.S. Department of Education, June 2002. https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/resources/legislative-history-major-ferpa-provisions.

Miller, L. Dee, Leen-Kiat Soh, Ashok Samal, Kevin Kupzyk, and Gwen Nugent. “A Comparison of Educational Statistics and Data Mining Approaches to Identify Characteristics That Impact Online Learning.” Journal of Educational Data Mining 7, no. 3 (October 15, 2015): 117–50. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3554732.

Nicol, Turner Lee. 2018. “Detecting Racial Bias in Algorithms and Machine Learning.” Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society 16 (3): 252-260. https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-06-2018-0056.

Ritvo, Dalia Topelson, Christopher Bavitz, Rajesh Gupta, and Irina Oberman. “Privacy and Children’s Data – An Overview of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.” The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research Publication Series, November 15, 2015. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354339.

Robertson, Lori. “Virginia Myths and More – FactCheck.Org.” FactCheck.org, June 4, 2009.. https://www.factcheck.org/2009/06/virginia-myths-and-more/.

Sepeda-Miller, Kiannah. “Preckwinkle Repeats Urban Myth about Third-Grade Test Scores, Prison Beds.” Politifact, March 24, 2019. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/mar/24/toni-preckwinkle/preckwinkle-repeats-urban-myth-about-third-grade-t/.

Winne, Philip H., and Ryan S.J.d. Baker. “The Potentials of Educational Data Mining for Researching Metacognition, Motivation and Self-Regulated Learning.” Journal of Educational Data Mining 5, no. 1 (May 1, 2013): 1–8. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3554620.

Zeide, Elana. “Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving beyond FERPA and FIPPs.” Drexel Law Review 8, no. 2 (November 18, 2016): 339–94. Last updated: February 22, 2017.https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821837.

Zuboff, Shoshana. “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization.” Journal of Information Technology 30, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 75–89. https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5.