Category: Opinion

Sean Woon, edited by Anna Goclawska

The great decoupling. Punitive sanctions for an illegal invasion. The weaponization of energy. Reshoring. Regardless of what new name is given, the program is the same — the restriction of goods, services, and financial flows to achieve geostrategic objectives. Increasingly, the entire global economy seems to be another tool for strategic competition.

(Photo by Lalit Kumar on Unsplash)  

This piece does not seek to convince you that the rise of economic coercion as a tool of statecraft should be something that you should pay more attention to — that goes without saying. Nor does it seek to examine whether economic statecraft would work; economic tools are valuable only when it is coupled with a clear strategic objective, the whole suite of statecraft (e.g. diplomacy and institution-building), and national power in all its facets (economic, military, cultural etc). In many instances where economic statecraft is employed, the ‘theory of victory’,[i] or what winning really looks like, is still unclear.  

What is clear, though, is that states are rapidly mobilising as they realise that the economic domain must be defended. Are states prepared to fight in the economic domain? What capabilities need to be built up? What fundamental assumptions need to be challenged?

What are we preparing for, exactly?

Economic coercion relies on imposing economic costs on states with the target of extracting policy concessions. It could be Russia’s restriction of gas supply that European states heavily rely upon,[ii] or the United States forcing advanced chip designers and developers (such as Intel and Nvidia) to bring manufacturing back,[iii] setting back Chinese firms that seek to rely on tech transfer. The target state might experience a loss of market competitiveness, higher cost of living, or capability setbacks — essentially losing its ability to compete on equal footing. States now bear the responsibility of reducing their vulnerability to supply shocks. Easy in theory, but tremendously difficult in practice.  

German economist Albert Hirschman outlined three key strategies to resist economic coercion back in 1958: maintain control of shipping routes, accumulate stockpiles of key resources, and redirect trade to countries that would be unlikely to disrupt it. [iv] That was written, however, for a state defending against WWII-style blockades. While some strategies still remain relevant, today’s key focus lies in ensuring that a state can maintain its income level. That means safeguarding the inputs required for critical industries, either by building national production capacity or at least diversifying them. If much of the world’s lithium supply is found in China, for example, states highly dependent on battery manufacturing would do well to ensure that there are alternative supplies.   

Why is this controversial? 

The fact that states should invest in building domestic capacity for critical sectors is a no-brainer; the UK with its National Investment Security Act 2021,[v] the US with its National Strategy for Advanced Manufacturing,[vi] and China’s dual-circulation strategy all point towards this being well-recognised. [vii] What is controversial, however, is throwing the full weight of the state behind advancing a cause traditionally left to the private sector.  

For much of the 20th century, the neoliberal movement and preference for a free market based on internationally agreed trading rules have dominated the global economic order. The Chinese model of state-led capitalism has been eschewed in favour of smaller government that did not get in the way of innovation and commerce. [viii] This in turn led to the globalisation of the supply chain and the possibility of outsourcing much of primary and secondary production, with advanced economies contributing the last step of putting it all together with just-in-time manufacturing methods. Heavily subsidising domestic investment into strategic industries or mandating technology transfer by investors, as China does, contradicts both the rules-based trading order and the professed stance of Western democracies – even though the CHIPS and Science Act has shown that the US is willing to break out of this model and enhance American competitiveness in the sector. [ix] The Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, which pledges $250bn to bolster scientific competition, marks another clear departure from the market-oriented approach in recognising that the American state must play an active role in strategic competition. [x]   

However, this raises further questions. Much of the transition is not as simple as throwing government funding at the problem; it requires acknowledging that manufactured goods might become more expensive as reshoring takes place. Factories would need to be built, workers in developed countries would command higher salaries than those in developing economies, and there might be more consumer inconvenience. Production decisions would not just depend on availability and cost would also encompass strategic considerations. Committing to consuming energy only from allies might mean asking your electoral base to stomach higher prices as adversaries dump oil on the market — and foreshadows the political nightmare of (re)introducing nuclear energy. It may also mean higher market interventions — restricting foreign investments into the country and examining foreign ownership of key infrastructure such as telecommunications, ports, and airlines. 

Regardless of whether economic coercion as a tool simply unleashes a cascade of tit-for-tat restrictions, the previous paragraph hopefully makes it apparent that defending state sovereignty requires much higher political will than it ever did. No longer is investing in hard, kinetic defence sufficient; governments must take measures that would be exceedingly unpopular in the short run. Are social compacts between states and their populations sufficiently strong to face the brunt of this challenge head-on? Is there sufficient commitment from the public to national interests, even at the expense of personal ones? Most importantly, is there sufficient recognition that the period of unfettered economic growth and the ‘peace dividend’ (whatever the nebulous concept of it implies) is over? There is no guarantee that the same conveniences and freedoms can be enjoyed ad infinitum; the cost will finally come home to ordinary people. While we cannot yet know if the economic strategic competition has any value, we would be remiss to ignore the lesson from the current energy crisis: capabilities and reserves are always better prepared for peacetime than when adversaries strike. One can only hope that nations — people and their governments — muster the will to prepare.  

Bibliography

[i] J. Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 38, no. 2 (May 1, 2008), https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2419.

[ii] Sam Meredith, “Russia Has Cut off Gas Supplies to Europe Indefinitely. Here’s What You Need to Know,” CNBC, September 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/06/energy-crisis-why-has-russia-cut-off-gas-supplies-to-europe.html.

[iii] PricewaterhouseCoopers, “The CHIPS Act: What It Means for the Semiconductor Ecosystem,” PwC, accessed December 6, 2022, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/library/forward-now-accounting-business-news/chips-act.html.

[iv] Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (University of California Press, 1945).

[v] National Security and Investment Act 2021

[vi] Subcommittee on Advanced Manufacturing, “National Strategy for Advanced Manufacturing” (National Science and Technology Council, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-Advanced-Manufacturing-10072022.pdf.

[vii] Tran Hung, “Dual Circulation in China: A Progress Report,” Atlantic Council (blog), October 24, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/dual-circulation-in-china-a-progress-report/.

[viii] “Many Countries Are Seeing a Revival of Industrial Policy,” The Economist, accessed December 6, 2022, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/01/10/many-countries-are-seeing-a-revival-of-industrial-policy.

[ix] See [3].

[x] Peter Cohan, “The $250 Billion U.S. Innovation and Competition Act Could Help Your Business,” Inc., June 10, 2021, https://www.inc.com/peter-cohan/250-billion-us-innovation-competition-act-could-help-your-business.html.

Jennifer Perratt

Why the Local Climate Action Summit is important

The Local Climate Action Summit (LCAS), hosted by the COP presidency and Bloomberg Philanthropies (a global charity), brought together hundreds of subnational leaders – including local government, businesses, and NGOs – to discuss how local efforts and multi-level partnerships between local and national leaders can improve global climate action. The summit ran from 1-2 December, early in the COP28 schedule, so that findings generated could feed into talks later in the conference, namely the Ministerial Meeting on Urbanisation and Climate Change on December 6. The summit was centred on four themes:

1. Transforming local climate finance

2. Integrating local action into national and international climate policy design and goals

3. Speeding up the local energy transition

4. Strengthening local resilience

The summit was the first time that the COP presidency hosted discussions specifically for subnational stakeholders. In addition, this COP was the first time a delegation of mayors and governors were present at the World Climate Action Summit – suggesting that subnational climate leaders’ ideas and concerns are beginning to be recognised as a crucial element of global climate action. But why is subnational leadership so important? And what new knowledge has this summit generated (and could future similar summits generate) compared to COP’s traditionally national-level discussions?

The summit as a potential spotlight for subnational action and knowledge

The summit allowed subnational governments to share best practices of how they’ve achieved this. A previous summit for subnational climate leadership has already proven that a space tailored to local action can be beneficial. The Climate Summit for Local Leaders (CSLL), hosted by Bloomberg Philanthropies during (but not officially connected to) COP21 was a predecessor of the LCAS. This gave subnational governments a structured opportunity to compare progress and advice with each other. Many attending mayors felt capable of more ambitious climate action due to the summit, and as a result, hundreds of them declared their commitment to The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy (GCOM). This Covenant committed mayors to creating climate targets, plans, emissions reporting, and climate risk assessments for their cities. Since then, more than 12,500 governments have committed to such plans (The Climate Group, 2023).

The LCAS could do the same, but with an official remit from the COP presidency and a more inclusive range of places and leaders. The CSt was limited to city mayors, and only partnered with C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), ICLEl and UCLG – coalitions which work only with city and local governments. In comparison, the LCAS extended invitations beyond mayors, and invited more progressive coalitions such as the Under2 Coalition and America Is All In. The former is a group of particularly ambitious subnational governments who have reduced their emissions by 16% on average from 1990 to 2015, while global average emissions rose by 42% in the same period (Owen-Burge, 2021). The latter is a coalition which actively involves indigenous leaders and faith groups, in contrast to the aforementioned coalitions. This expanded inclusion brought knowledge from a broader range of places and non-governmental leaderships. Lastly, the CSLL was also hosted outside of COP proceedings, while the LCAS was hosted formally within COP, giving a greater public spotlight to the importance of multi-level climate governance.

The summit was less contentious than national level proceedings

COP talks have at times been stalled by more climate vulnerable or progressive nations using their leverage to push their less progressive counterparts. For instance, at the Bonn Climate Change

Conference in June this year, developing nations refused to increase their climate mitigation ambitions unless the failure of countries to deliver on promised climate finance was also addressed. Furthermore, it is predicted that at this COP, EU and climate vulnerable nations will strongly push for all nations to agree to entirely phase out fossil fuels, rather than the phase down (i.e. reduction but not removal) which is preferred by nations that still heavily rely on fossil fuels. Some nations may even refuse to sign a commitment to renewable energy if the phase out terminology is not unanimously adopted. Highly contentious issues like phase out vs phase down were avoided entirely at this summit, instead being left for national discussions. This may be because subnational governments tend to be more ambitious than their national governments – so they may be willing to be more progressive than national delegations on such issues.

The summit as a missed opportunity to improve climate financing for subnational regions

Despite the clear benefits of this summit, a retrospective analysis reveals that its speakers did not discuss how subnational governments could improve climate financing for more vulnerable regions. Less than 17% of international climate adaptation finance distributed now was allocated specifically to local community projects (Canales and Savvidou, 2023). As for financing for climate-related loss and damage recovery, the ‘loss and damage fund’ to be discussed at COP28 is expected to run into disagreement, with the idea of mandatory contributions to the fund expected to be a point of contention. It is therefore crucial to pursue other forms of loss and damage funding in the meantime.

Not only could subnational leaders at the summit have used this international platform to highlight the need for more localised finance, but attendees could have explored how to provide the funding themselves. There is precedent for transnational funding between cities (rather than between nations): earlier this year, C40 established the Inclusive Climate Action Cities Fund. This fund provides funding for climate mitigation and adaptation to six C40 member cities, many of whom have struggled to find funding elsewhere as they do not qualify as the most ‘climate vulnerable’ cities, such as Warsaw. At the LCAS, C40 could have shared their expertise on establishing this fund so that subnational governments in attendance could agree to a similar initiative involving cities or regions outside of the C40.

The summit missed an opportunity for youth engagement

All speakers at the LCAS were from government and media, including UN representatives, Special Envoys for Climate Change, mayors, and governors. Although it is of course an achievement that local leaders have finally been given an official space at COP, there was a conspicuous lack of perspectives from youth leaders at this summit.

Youth participants are conducting ground-breaking work outside official proceedings in the Green Zone, which is the ‘public’ side where anyone can speak and hear discussions. In comparison, the Blue Zone is the ‘official’ side where negotiations are held in closed discussions among UN-approved delegates and observers only). A group of young observers, for instance, launched the Future Generations Tribunal, an international moral tribunal that aims to highlight and solve the lack of legally binding mechanisms that hold people accountable for a liveable planet. Green Zone discussions are less likely to reach the biggest decision-makers, as they reserve their time for the official Blue Zone discussions. The LCAS missed a unique opportunity to highlight such young people’s perspectives on how current systems of governance fail to capture the climate issue – an opinion that could have constructively critiqued the other speakers’ perspectives from within the system.

Young climate leaders have a lived experience of working on local climate action, which makes them a wealth of knowledge for local government leaders. Furthermore, these leaders have a vested interest in pursuing solutions with the best long-term outcome rather than preserving existing systems, as evidenced by the Future Generations Tribunal, as their generation will be living with the

consequences of today’s actions. The exclusion of youth voices suggests that youth climate activists are justified in their growing disenchantment of COP as a productive platform for climate action. Greta Thunberg has called COP a greenwashing exercise, while Ayisha Siddiqa, a Youth Climate Advisor to the UN Secretary General, states that COP has obvious limitations for needed climate action.

Looking beyond the summit

As the recent UNEP (2023) report Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record – Temperatures hit new highs, yet world fails to cut emissions (again) points out, progress with national-level climate governance has been too slow to reach the Paris Agreement 1.5°C pathway and 2°C pathway. Many countries failed to meet their NDCs in the Global Stocktake, and there are ongoing issues with the aforementioned loss and damage’ fund, which was proposed a decade ago.

Perhaps the LCAS is an indication that the UN is starting to embrace polycentric governance of climate change, and recognises that the historic top-down, national-level approach is not sufficient. Some discussions and agreements are more productive, agile, and progressive on a sub-national level. If this summit produces long term successful outcomes, we could see future COPs embracing sub-national climate leadership more enthusiastically.

Bibliography

Canales and Savvidou, 2023. Guest post: Three major gaps in climate-adaptation finance for developing countries, Carbon Brief website, accessed 30 November 2023. Available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-three-major-gaps-in-climate-adaptation-finance-for-developing-countries/ Owen-Burge, 2021. Under 2 Coalition, UNFCC website, accessed 30 November 2023. Available at https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/team_member/under-2-coalition/

The Climate Group, 2023. COP28 President-Designate Sultan Al Jaber and UN Special Envoy Michael Bloomberg announce first COP-hosted ‘Local Climate Action Summit’, The Climate Group website, accessed 2 December 2023. Available at https://www.theclimategroup.org/our-work/news/cop28-president-designate-sultan-al-jaber-and-un-special-envoy-michael-bloomberg

UNEP, 2023. Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record – Temperatures hit new highs, yet world fails to cut emissions (again), UNEP website, accessed 3 November 2023. Available at https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2023

Alicia Blount

It is the 23^rd of June 2016. The nation holds its breath; then, one half lets out a hearty cheer, waving pickets with strong proclamations: “Take Back Control” and “We want OUR country back!”; the other half lets out a sigh; or a cry mixed with disbelief, shock, anger, fear, anxiety. An amalgam of emotions grips the United Kingdom on this day, as 52% of voters have sealed the fate of Britain’s future with the European Union by voting for Brexit, a firm stance against globalisation and a collectivised Europe.

For years, Nigel Farage, UKIP, and its far-right political voices lambasted the EU’s allegedly ‘excessive control’ over British [foreign] policy and affairs, citing the reclaiming of Great British sovereignty as a necessity that would only be facilitated through voting to Leave. In particular, a great focus was lent to scrutinising rates of immigration into the UK and a perceived lack of control over the borders, with 1/3^rd of Leave voters citing this as their primary voting motivation in Lord Ashcroft’s 2020 poll.

Five Conservative Prime Ministers and four failed Brexit withdrawal agreements later, how has Britain fared in reclaiming its once ‘lost’ sovereignty and control over its borders?

To answer, we need only turn to the migration statistics since the effectuation of Brexit in 2020. In 2021, approximately 28,526 small boats crossed the channel, with this figure skyrocketing in 2022, peaking at approximately 46,000 people crossing the English Channel in boats. As of 15 November 2023, migration levels have fallen by 1/3^rd in comparison to 2022, but still much greater than seen in previous years pre-COVID. The vast majority of those crossing the channel are asylum seekers whose applications have not yet been processed or whom the government wishes to redirect to another nation for processing.

Arguably, these levels could have risen as a consequence of Brexit given that, previously, with its membership status in the EU, the United Kingdom benefitted from the Dublin Regulation’s redirection of asylum seekers to newly democratised states, therefore indirectly placing pressure off key EU member states. Given that this system increasingly pushes boundaries of what is a ‘safe’ country in which to seek asylum, core member states can redirect the pressure of major refugee and asylum seeker levels onto new members in the East and South. Britain largely benefited from this systemic rejection of immigrants and outsourcing when removing itself from the EU, given that it then removed itself from this indirect protective barrier from large levels of asylum seekers. Without this extra level of redirection, Britain directly receives a greater number of migrants and asylum seekers in general, as there is no legal alternative pathway.

Therefore, facing pressure to respond to these levels and replace the effect of the EU’s filtration system – especially given the rising disapproval levels towards the government and Brexit voters’ remorse – the Tory party under Boris Johnson signed a memorandum of understanding with the Rwandan government to bring to life the Rwanda Asylum Plan. Proposed in 2022 by then incumbent home secretary Priti Patel, this policy would see illegal immigrants or asylum seekers aiming to enter the UK relocated to Rwanda; a land-locked country in east-central Africa, 6,500km away from the UK; for processing and resettlement, with those successfully claiming asylum in Rwanda no longer being permitted to return to the UK.

Has this proposal been well-received or projected to be a successful endeavour? Not quite.

Certainly, however, one thing has been made remarkably clear: the Conservative government is desperately intent upon continuing to shirk blame for the failings of British foreign policy goals onto the European Union and European institutions, citing the European Court of Human Rights as contrarian to so-called ‘British Values’; despite the ECHR’s rejection of the policy being echoed in a recent judgement call by The Right Honourable Lord Reed of the UK Supreme Court, the highest court in the nation, who equally confirmed that the MoU was unlawful given that Rwanda was found not to be a safe third country to send asylum seekers.

This decision was met with much dissent from the Tory government, which has pushed consistently for constitutional reform post-Brexit to free the executive from accountability or oversight by the judicial, with Dominic Raab notably pushing to weaken the court’s powers through the Judicial Review and Courts Bill in 2022, which would seek to allow the government to ignore rulings that it disagrees with; abolishing the jurisdiction of the High Court to review decisions of (particularly, immigration) tribunals, and altering orders that judges can make against the state.

Hence, all these factors introduce the Great Brexit Irony, in which promises are made, not met, and consequently, goalposts continually get pushed to avert blame and public attention elsewhere. When once the British Government lacked true sovereignty or control over borders because of a despotic European Union, it then lacked true control because of the grips of the ECHR; then, when this narrative failed, it was because of the overzealousness of our domestic judiciary.  

In a post-Brexit Britain, the government, and even more broadly, the right wing, continues to cannibalise itself, making promises upon which it cannot follow through while blaming institutions that we are no longer a part of – institutions which once provided the UK with the protection that the Rwanda asylum plan aims to replicate but lack the institutional support to sustain.

Yet, while the British public has overwhelmingly changed their mind on this notorious, fateful referendum, the executive continues to obstinately dig in its heels: and will likely continue to do so, until they are voted out of power.

Bibliography

Ashcroft, Lord. 2016. “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday… And Why.” Lordashcroftpolls.com. June 24, 2016. https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.

BBC News. 2022. “Why Are Asylum Seekers Being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?” BBC News, June 15, 2022, sec. Explainers. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-61782866.

“Channel-Tracker | Migration Watch UK.” n.d. Www.migrationwatchuk.org. https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/channel-crossings-tracker.

“Dominic Raab’s Judicial Review Plans Are Another Power Grab.” n.d. Tribunemag.co.uk. Accessed December 3, 2023. https://tribunemag.co.uk/2022/01/judicial-review-conservative-party-legislation-dominic-raab-boris-johnson

Goddard, James. 2023. Review of UK-Rwanda Asylum Agreement: Why Is It a Memorandum of Understanding and Not a Treaty? House of Lords Library. UK Parliament. January 26, 2023. https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-rwanda-asylum-agreement-why-is-it-a-memorandum-of-understanding-and-not-a-treaty/.

“UK Supreme Court Flexes Judicial Muscles with Rwanda Ruling.” n.d. Www.ft.com. Accessed December 3, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/61b7b326-d38c-4e1c-824b-c396c744cda6.

‌ Yeo, Colin. 2021. “It Is Time to Think about Rejoining the EU’s Dublin Asylum System.” Free Movement. November 29, 2021. https://freemovement.org.uk/rejoining-dublin-asylum-system/.

Eleanor Pang

The Mekong River basin plays a critical role in the livelihood of millions who live along its fringes and depend on it as a source of food, mode of transport, and place of community.  

As the largest transboundary river in Asia, spanning six countries, the Mekong River basin has become a hotbed for conflict over its many uses. In recent years, the construction of multiple hydroelectric dams by Mekong-adjacent countries along the river has been a great source of international disputes, as the dams reduce river water levels, cause massive amounts of soil erosion, and decimate local fish populations. 

Most notably, the construction of China’s Xiaowan and Nuozhadu dams in the upper Mekong River, or as China terms it, the “Lancang” River, has been a key source of tension between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours. This is because many citizens of these countries have been adversely affected by the lowered water levels downstream. These dams are far from the only ones, with many more currently under construction as China seeks to find renewable energy alternatives to reduce its reliance on coal and bolster its rapid industrialisation efforts. This vast network of over 100 dams, draining water from the tributaries and main river in the upper Mekong region, is by no means an innocent instrument to procure a crucial resource. Rather, these dams, and many more to come, are insidiously linked to China’s larger “Go West” strategy predicated on the use of the development of hydropower to integrate neighbouring countries into its political and economic sphere of influence. 

China’s “Go West” strategy, otherwise known as their “Great Western Development Strategy”, conceives the Yunnan provinces as a “gateway” to trade with its Southeast and South Asian neighbours since the upper Mekong flows within its borders downstream towards Myanmar. This strategic location allows China to use the Mekong as a convenient source of hydroelectric power for the other provinces. Further, the location effectively converts it into a “highway” for international trade. Doing so simultaneously bolsters globalisation and industrialisation efforts in southwest China while strengthening its economic influence over Southeast and South Asia, in line with its Belt and Road initiative. 

That said, a discussion about the geopolitics of the Mekong River would be amiss without bringing in the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which may be traced back to the Cold War when it was first established as the Mekong Committee by the United States and the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, the commission became perceived as an engine for driving the region’s economic development in hopes that it would not succumb to communism, preserving its geopolitical stability in favour of the Allies. The deliberate omission of Burma and China is further evidence of the Cold War thinking that dominated this era. The Mekong thus became yet another arena in which Cold War geopolitics played out.  

However, this “omission” has favored Chinese regional interests, as China’s construction of dams without prior consultation of the MRC could take place conveniently since it is not a member and hence not under the MRC’s jurisdiction. 

China’s control over the upper Mekong through its dams increases the vulnerability of its Southeast Asian neighbours, as evident from the ecological damage caused by low water levels in the middle and lower Mekong. This power imbalance over Southeast Asia is exacerbated by China’s strategic institutional competition, particularly the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum in 2015, which has become yet another channel for Chinese development aid to flow to developing ASEAN member states, namely Laos and Cambodia. The LMC not only diminishes the authority of the MRC as a penultimate governing body over Mekong-related issues but also poses a direct challenge to the adjacent Lower Mekong Initiative (now expanded to become the U.S. Mekong Partnership) started by the United States in 2009. It appears that the Mekong River has become yet another “U.S. versus China” playing field. 

While arguments can be made for how the region as a whole stands to benefit from competing aid and investment regimes, the dangers of this new “institutional plurality” lie in how it disrupts the existing regional cohesion and reduces the legitimacy of Southeast Asian countries’ jurisdiction over the Mekong. Superpower-led multilateralism is not unique to the Mekong, but rather is a reality in international politics, where the individual agencies of smaller countries become entangled in the larger “U.S.-China” conflict. 

Ultimately, any response to China’s Mekong “hydro-hegemony” has to be coordinated and cohesive. In light of China’s numerous transgressions into the Exclusive Economic Zones of Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea, it is incumbent upon these countries to reaffirm their commitment to achieving consensus and taking collective action against larger states seeking to undermine their agency. Amidst the power struggle between two superpowers, the survival of millions depending on the Mekong hangs in the balance.  

Bibliography  

Climate Diplomacy. 1995. “Dam projects and disputes in the Mekong River Basin.” [online] Available from: https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/dam-projects-and-disputes-mekong-river-basin (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

K. L. F. 2022. “Hydro-Hegemony and Great Power competition on the Mekong River — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW.” [online] Available from: https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/ikjtfxf3nmqgd0np1ht10mvkfron6n-bykaf-ey3hc-rfbxp#:~:text=This%20unilateral%20control%20of%20the,in%20the%20Lower%20Mekong%20Basin (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Guerreiro. 2021. “What Chinese dams in Laos tell us about the Belt and Road initiative.” [online] Available from: https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-chinese-dams-in-laos-tell-us-about-the-belt-and-road-initiative/ (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Haefner. n.d. “Duelling diplomacy over Southeast Asia’s most important river.” [online] Available from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/duelling-diplomacy-over-southeast-asia-s-most-important-river (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Haefner. 2020. “The Mekong River is Becoming a Geopolitical Hotspot.” [online] Available from: https://www.brinknews.com/the-mekong-river-is-becoming-a-geopolitical-hotspot/ (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Jacobs, J. W. 1995. “Mekong Committee History and Lessons for River Basin development. The Geographical Journal.” [Online] 161 (2), 135. [online] Available from: https://doi.org/10.2307/3059971. 

Kliem. 2020. “The Geopolitics of the Mekong and a Radical Proposal for ASEAN to Navigate it.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 

Onn, L. P. 2021. “2021/69 “The Mekong River Ecosystem in Crisis: ASEAN Cannot be a Bystander” by Hoang Thi Ha and Farah Nadine Seth – ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.” [online] Available from: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-69-the-mekong-river-ecosystem-in-crisis-asean-cannot-be-a-bystander-by-hoang-thi-ha-and-farah-nadine-seth/ (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Phanishsarn, A. 2006. “Economic Implications of China´ s “ Go‑ West” Policy: A View from Thailand. ASEAN Economic Bulletin.” [Online] 23 (2), 253–265. [online] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1355/ae23-2g. 

Simmala, B. & Lee, C. 2023. “China’s Mekong River dams expected to worsen southeast Asian economies during drought. Voice of America. 4 August.” [online] Available from: https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-mekong-river-dams-expected-to-worsen-southeast-asian-economies-during-drought-/7211918.html. 

Soutullo, J. 2019. “The Mekong River: Geopolitics Over Development, Hydropower and the Environment : Study.” 

Strangio. 2021. “Indonesia seeking Southeast Asian coordination on South China Sea disputes.” [online] Available from: https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/indonesia-seeking-southeast-asian-coordination-on-south-china-sea-disputes/ (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Teo et al. 2022. “Interests, Initiatives, and Influence: Geopolitics in the Mekong Subregion.” [online] Available from: https://www.nbr.org/publication/interests-initiatives-and-influence-geopolitics-in-the-mekong-subregion/ (Accessed 26 October 2023). 

Antonio Macedo

The 8th and 9th of December are decisive for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia: This is when the interior ministers of EU member states are scheduled to decide on their accession to the Schengen area. A unanimous vote is required. Schengen is a source of pride for Europeans, comprising the largest free-travel zone in the world where more than 400 million citizens freely roam across 26 states (22 EU and four non-EU states). Despite this, the accession process has been slow: Romania and Bulgaria, which completed the necessary checks for accession back in 2011, have now waited over a decade for the green light. Similarly, although to a lesser extent, Croatia completed the evaluation process in 2020, yet is still waiting to reap the benefits of joining.

Continue reading ““Back to drawing borders”: Are Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia ready for Schengen?” →

Mariola García-Cañada Candela

The nuclear dilemma in South Korea has become an everyday topic for its population. The intense provocations of Kim Jong Un have led 71% of the South Koreans to strive for the nuclearization of the Peninsula. This support is unlikely to decrease but rather grow as the threats from the North Korean leader continue intensifying through 2023 as they seek an exponential increase of their nuclear arsenal, which will be used as a defensive and offensive tool. This is no surprise when talking about the North Korean leader because, as Edward A. Olsen explains, Kim Jong Un’s best defence is a good offence. The actual concern lies in the South Korean and North American response to such threats, which, if they are nuclear, would undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Peninsula, increasing the possibility of the dreaded nuclear domino effect in East Asia.

Continue reading “A Nuclear Korean Peninsula: The Dreaded Domino Effect in East Asia?” →

Tanya Lim

Public administrations increasingly use AI to determine the allocation of social benefits: Judges uses risk assessment algorithms to determine a person’s innate ability for bail or parole, social media platforms use AI to optimize content moderation, and political actors use these platforms to engage in micro-targeting to more accurately spread disinformation and enhance the state’s surveillance on citizens. However, given its relative “black box” nature, how is AI threatening our capacity to exercise scrutiny over the decisions of public democratic institutions?

Continue reading “Big Brother Reality: Could Artificial Intelligence Lead to the End of Democracy?” →

Veronica Orbecchi

Any organism’s characteristics are determined by their genes. Our genes contain information about features like height, the colour of our eyes, or our susceptibility to diseases. Owing to formidable scientific advances, gene editing tools now make it possible to make precise alterations to an organism’s genes in vivo. Among the promising applications of gene editing, these tools may help prevent or treat various diseases, increase the efficiency of agriculture and food production or significantly improve research methods. Since the discovery of CRISPR-Cas9 one decade ago, gene editing has become much faster, cheaper and more reliable than previous strategies that were being developed since the 1980s (Baylis et al, 2020). While the remarkable potential of gene editing to bring about positive change increases with its ever growing effectiveness, this potential is undeniably accompanied by a number of un-negligible risks and a certain degree of moral unease. This elicits the need for appropriate regulations for these techniques.

Continue reading “Regulating Human Germline Editing” →